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INTRODUCTION
On July 14, 2009, Secretary of Housing and Urban Development Shaun
Donovan delivered a speech in which he laid out for the first time "the Obama
Yale Law School, J.D. expected January 2o11; Yale University, B.A. 2005. I would
like to thank Owen Fiss, Philip Tegeler, Adam Chandler, Chris Griffin, and
Mishele Kieffer, for their thoughtful comments and feedback.
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Administration's vision for neighborhood transformation for the 21st century."'
The centerpiece of Secretary Donovan's remarks, and of the new
Administration's approach to urban poverty, is the Choice Neighborhoods
initiative, a $250 million grant program to stimulate the revitalization of poor,
inner-city areas. Under Choice Neighborhoods, the Department of Housing
and Urban Development (HUD) will extend grants to public, private, and
nonprofit organizations to provide public housing and other community
services (e.g., after-school programs, childcare, and job counseling) to residents
of urban communities. The philosophy behind Choice Neighborhoods, in the
words of Secretary Donovan, is that not only is housing in ghetto areas
substandard, "the communities themselves [are] substandard."'
According to Secretary Donovan, the Obama Administration's focus on
neighborhoods as the key to assisting ghetto communities differentiates its
approach from that of the Clinton Administration. Under President Clinton,
HUD sought to end urban poverty primarily through the HOPE VI program, a
policy centered on revamping public housing. Choice Neighborhoods, claims
Secretary Donovan, will reach more broadly than HOPE VI:
[P]ublic housing transformation is still our priority at HUD....
But a Hope VI development that is surrounded by disinvestment,
by failing schools or by other distressed housing has virtually no chance
of truly succeeding.
That's what Choice Neighborhoods is all about. It would expand
on the legacy of HOPE VI by expanding the range of activities eligible
for funding and capitalize on the full range of stakeholders we know
are needed and want to be involved-from local governments and
non-profits to private firms and public housing agencies.
I believe Choice Neighborhoods will do for our communities what
HOPE VI did for public housing-as far as I'm concerned, it must.
3
Secretary Donovan and President Obama's approach to improving the
welfare of ghetto communities is founded on two understandings that this Note
strongly supports: first, that concentrated poverty-particularly racially
concentrated poverty-is unacceptable and demands an affirmative response
from the federal government; and second, that individuals living in ghettos
deserve both an adequate physical place to live and the ability to live in a
community of opportunity. The commitment to proactive, race-conscious
policymaking in housing and the conception of residential rights as a guarantee
i. Shaun Donovan, Sec'y, Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., Prepared Remarks at the
National Press Club: From Despair to Hope: Two HUD Secretaries on Urban
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of high-quality neighborhoods are both essential for a government committed
to justice.
This Note will argue, however, that the Obama Administration should
promote its vision of urban justice through a massive reform to the Section 8
rental-assistance program, not through Choice Neighborhoods alone. The same
philosophies that motivate Choice Neighborhoods also compel a new national
voucher program, the explicit aim of which is to help minority families move
from ghettos to communities of opportunity. This new program might feature
what this Note refers to as "opportunity-housing vouchers." Like Choice
Neighborhoods, the new voucher program would frame residential rights in
terms of living in high-quality areas where jobs, good schools, and safe streets
abound. Unlike Choice Neighborhoods, however, the voucher program's
specific aim would be to end the pattern of racial ghettoization, not to
transform American ghettos into better residential areas.
This Note makes the case for an opportunity-housing vouchers program in
two steps. First, it argues that from a perspective of justice, housing law in the
United States should be founded upon a new normative theory squarely
committed to antighettoization. The moral frameworks that currently drive our
housing laws posit antidiscrimination, remediation, and anti-disparate impact
as the fulfillment of racial fairness with respect to housing rights. These
conceptions of justice do not go far enough. Under an antighettoization theory,
alternatively, the eradication of racially concentrated ghettos in itself would be
the prioritized central objective. Opportunity vouchers are desirable because
they realize that objective.
Second, this Note argues for opportunity-housing vouchers not only from a
justice standpoint but also from a pragmatic one; opportunity-housing
vouchers make good public policy. As with the Section 8 rental assistance
program, opportunity-housing vouchers would provide low-income families
with subsidies to rent otherwise unaffordable housing units.4 Unlike Section 8
vouchers, however, opportunity-housing vouchers would have two unique
features. They only would allow families to rent apartments in what are
identified as "communities of opportunity," and they would be allocated by
HUD in a race-conscious fashion. Opportunity-housing vouchers make good
policy sense because they would promote deconcentration directly, without the
federal government's bearing the herculean task of renovating the country's
poorest neighborhoods. This Note draws on several voucher programs that
cities, as well as HUD, have implemented to show that vouchers can be an
effective and relatively cost-efficient means of dismantling racial ghettos. This
Note also explains how the voucher program it proposes differs from the largely
unsuccessful policy experiment implemented by Congress in the 199os, the
Moving to Opportunity program.
Although the Supreme Court's contemporary Equal Protection Clause
jurisprudence casts suspicion on government activities that differentiate on the
4. For an explanation of the mechanics of Section 8, see infra text accompanying
notes 81-83.
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basis of race, the Court could nonetheless sanction opportunity-housing
vouchers in one of two ways. First, the Court could subject opportunity-
housing vouchers to strict scrutiny as it does for most race-conscious
government policies, but uphold the program because it furthers a compelling
societal interest and is narrowly tailored. Here, the Court would place
antighettoization policy on par with diversity promotion in universities and
with remedial plans to mitigate historical discrimination, the two other
activities the Court has sustained under strict scrutiny.5 Second, the Court could
exempt opportunity-housing vouchers from strict scrutiny altogether, drawing
on Justice Kennedy's concurrence in Parents Involved in Community Schools v.
Seattle School District No. 1,6 which now appears to command a majority of the
Court's support. Given that opportunity-housing vouchers take cognizance of
race in allocating benefits overall, but not in selecting beneficiaries, the program
follows Justice Kennedy's model of a race-conscious policy that should be
immune from strict scrutiny.
The remainder of this Note is structured as follows. Part I explains why
antighettoization, the normative framework that compels the proposed
opportunity-housing vouchers, is the ideal theory of justice for housing law.
7 It
begins in Section L.A by exploring the normative frameworks that currently
guide housing law in the United States: antidiscrimination, remediation, and
anti-disparate impact. Section I.B shows that none of these three normative
frameworks is sufficient. In Section I.C, this Note advocates for
antighettoization as the preferable theory of justice for housing law. It defends
antighettoization against two important critiques: one, that it is logically
indefensible to have a specific theory of racial justice for housing; and another,
that antighettoization does not go far enough in guaranteeing liberty for ghetto
residents. Instead, this Note argues that it is logical to have a specific theory of
justice for housing and that maximizing the residential choices of ghetto
residents does not carry the same moral weight as eliminating racial
ghettoization.
Part II demonstrates than an opportunity-housing vouchers program is not
only normatively appealing but also is an effective public policy. Section II.A
outlines the design of a new opportunity-housing vouchers program.
Opportunity-housing vouchers would resemble Section 8 vouchers but would
carry geographic restrictions and would be allocated in a race-conscious
manner. Section II.A discusses how, compared to alternative strategies of
realizing antighettoization, such as initiatives to build enterprise zones in
5. See infra notes 162-163 and accompanying text.
6. 551 U.S. 701 (2007).
7. This Note is concerned with theories of racial justice, i.e., what constitutes fair
treatment for different racial groups, rather than with theories of economic or
political justice. Thus, when the terms "justice" or "theory of justice" are used
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downtown areas, a voucher program carries more promise and less expense. In
Section II.B, this Note explains why an opportunity-housing voucher holds
promise even though several deconcentration programs already piloted, such as
the congressionally authorized Moving to Opportunity initiative, have enjoyed
mixed results. Here, the Note draws significantly from Thompson v. HUD,8 a
housing lawsuit pending in Maryland federal district court. The plaintiffs in
Thompson have proposed an innovative deconcentration remedy that includes
mobility counseling, a regional administration of vouchers, and an overhaul of
the relationship between HUD and local housing authorities. These program
features carry enormous potential for overcoming obstacles that mobility
programs have encountered in the past. Section II.B presents original ideas for
structuring a deconcentration program to facilitate socioeconomic
advancement for minority households that move out of the ghetto. The
conclusion from Part II is that an opportunity-housing vouchers program can
be designed effectively. The Obama Administration has a sufficient collection of
models from which to draw. Whether or not it continues with Choice
Neighborhoods, the Administration should use its political momentum to
implement an opportunity-housing vouchers component within Section 8.
I. A NEW THEORY OF JUSTICE FOR HOUSING LAW: ANTIGHETTOIZATION
The normative frameworks that currently shape federal housing law in the
United States do not go far enough in guaranteeing racial justice. While these
frameworks do call for various forms of equal treatment across racial groups,
none demands an end to racial ghettoization itself, and none ensures the
promise of housing in communities of opportunity for racial minorities. This
Part will explain why antighettoization is the preferable theory of justice for
U.S. housing law and will defend antighettoization against potential critiques.
A. Alternative Theories of Justice Embodied in Contemporary U.S. Housing
Law
The federal laws concerning housing rights today are animated by three
theories of racial justice: antidiscrimination, remediation, and anti-disparate
impact. Under each theory, fair treatment across racial groups carries a different
meaning. Unquestionably, antidiscrimination, remediation, and anti-disparate
impact are concepts that resurface throughout American law, motivating
statutes regarding employment, voting, schooling, and other social spheres. In
the context of housing law, each theory drives a key statute or body of case law
on housing rights, as this Section reviews.
8. 348 F. Supp. 2d 398 (D. Md. 2005).
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1. Antidiscrimination: The Fair Housing Act
The first theory of justice central to federal housing law is
antidiscrimination. Antidiscrimination is expressed in the core provisions of the
Fair Housing Act (FHA), which prohibit marketplace actors from expressing
racial preferences in the sale, rental, and advertising of homes.9 In 1988,
Congress created a private right of action to sue under the FHA so that a
plaintiff need not exhaust administrative remedies.'° Any person, regardless of
race, has standing,' as long as the plaintiff can show that the defendant acted
"on the basis of race" in her housing market transactions.
Section 3604 of the Fair Housing Act-the Act's central provision-seeks to
promote racial justice in the housing market through the "private attorneys
general" model. Aggrieved individuals can challenge biased practices in court.
This provision does not prescribe, however, that federal or local actors
undertake any affirmative institutional changes. As the Supreme Court
recognized in Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.:
[C]omplaints by private persons are the primary method of obtaining
compliance with the Act.
[T]he main generating force must be private suits in which... the
complainants act not only on their own behalf but also "as private
attorneys general in vindicating a policy that Congress considered to be
of the highest priority."'2
Many scholars have criticized the defensive posture that the FHA takes
towards expanding racial justice in the housing market. 3
9. 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (2006) ("[I]t shall be unlawful - (a) To refuse to sell or rent... a
dwelling to any person because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or
national origin. (b) To discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions,
or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling.., because of race, color, religion, sex,
familial status, or national origin....").
1O. See Michael P. Seng & F. Willis Caruso, Forty Years of Fair Housing: Where Do We
Go from Here?, 18 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 235, 236 (2009).
11. Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 210 (1972).
12. Id. at 2o9-n1 (quoting Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968)).
13. See, e.g., john a. powell, Reflections on the Past, Looking to the Future: The Fair
Housing Act at 40, 18 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 145, 146
(2OO9) ("The antidiscrimination orientation of the Fair Housing Act may itself be
an impediment to achieving the goal of an integrated society .... The enforcement
mechanisms of the Act . . . are largely individualistic, antidiscrimination tort
approaches. These provisions may increase the freedom of choice for homebuyers
but have not necessarily helped produce integrated neighborhoods or addressed
segregated living patterns.").
28:481 2010
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Despite its limitations, the FHA has helped limit a wide variety of
discriminatory behavior in the housing market over the past forty years.
Plaintiffs have challenged successfully "racial steering" by landlords and real
estate agents,14 mortgage and reverse red-lining by lenders, 5 insurance
redlining," and other exclusionary tactics such as selective gating of
communities.1
7
2. Remediation: The Equal Protection Clause
A second theory of racial justice expressed prominently in American
housing law is the need to remedy past governmental discrimination against
racial minorities. This theory of justice is a close cousin of antidiscrimination
theory. Remediation "makes whole" victims of historical mistreatment and
thereby lays the foundation for a society that does not account for race in
official decision-making. Both the Supreme Court and the lower federal courts,
applying the Equal Protection Clause to practices in the housing market, have
construed the Clause to demand remediation.
The Supreme Court first developed the remediation framework for racial
justice not in housing cases but in school desegregation cases. In Milliken v.
Bradley,S the Court held that the Constitution required remediation for racial
groups to correct identifiable episodes of state discrimination. The purpose of
remediation is to "restore the victims of discriminatory conduct to the position
they would have occupied in the absence of such conduct."1 9 The Court
imported the remedial theory of justice into housing law in Hills v. Gautreaux.2"
In Gautreaux, the Court upheld a district court's race-conscious injunctive
order remedying extensive discrimination by HUD. The Court held that, just as
the Equal Protection Clause obligates federal authorities to undo de jure
segregation in public schools, so too does it obligate authorities to remedy their
discriminatory practices in public housing.2'
14. E.g., United States v. Mitchell, 580 F.2d 789, 791 (5th Cir. 1978).
15. E.g., Barkley v. Olympia Mortgage Co., No. 04 CV 875 (RJD) (KAM), 2007 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 61940 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 22, 2007); Hargraves v. Capital City Mortgage
Corp., 14o F. Supp. 2d 7 (D.D.C. 2000).
16. E.g., NAACP v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 978 F.2d 287, 301 (7th Cir. 1992).
17. E.g., Evans v. Tubbe, 657 F.2d 661 (sth Cir. Unit B Sept. 1981).
18. 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
19. Id. at 746.
20. 425 U.S. 284 (1976).
21. Id. at 297. While there are sections of the initial Gautreaux opinion that appear to
embrace a more progressive, anti-disparate impact theory of racial justice, id. at
301-02, by the 199os, the Supreme Court had restated its holding in Gautreaux as
advancing the remediation theory. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 97-98
(1995).
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Since Gautreaux, federal courts applying the Equal Protection Clause in
housing discrimination lawsuits similarly have invoked the justice-as-
compensation rationale. When plaintiffs are able to show that housing
authorities have discriminated on the basis of race, either in recent years or in
the more distant past, courts will demand that the government provide relief to
plaintiffs for the harms they have suffered.2 About fifteen federal cases decided
since 1974 have involved a judicial finding of liability by government actors for
historical discrimination in public housing and have resulted in a Gautreaux-
style remedy. 3
3. Anti-Disparate Impact: Appellate Court Jurisprudence on the Fair
Housing Act
The third theory of justice advanced by federal housing law is an anti-
disparate impact theory. Under this normative framework, racial fairness
demands not only neutral or even compensatory treatment by the government
towards racial groups, it also requires that the government adjust its activities in
the housing market to avoid an unnecessarily large negative impact on minority
groups. Appellate and district courts have created an anti-disparate impact
requirement under two separate sections of the FHA: the Act's
antidiscrimination provision, set forth at § 3604,24 and the Act's "affirmative"
provision, set forth at § 3608(e). 5
First, with regards to § 3604, the Seventh Circuit paved the way for the
evolution in the case law in Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. v. Village
of Arlington Heights ("Arlington Heights 11/,).26 The court declined "to take a
narrow view of the phrase 'because of race' contained in section 3604(a)" and
held that § 3604 outlaws disparate impact in housing just as Title VII does in
employment.27 Since Arlington Heights II, nearly every federal court has reached
22. See, e.g., Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126 (3d Cir. 1977); Hicks v.
Weaver, 302 F. Supp. 619 (E.D. La. 1969).
23. For a compilation of all housing lawsuits against HUD that were decided under
the Equal Protection Clause and that resulted in a deconcentration remedy, see
Florence Wagman Roisman, Long Overdue: Desegregation Litigation and Next
Steps To End Discrimination and Segregation in the Public Housing and Section 8
Existing Housing Programs, CITYSCAPE, 1999, at 171, app. at 194-95, available at
http://www.huduser.org/Periodicals/CITYSCPEIVOL4NUM3/roisman.pdf.
24. 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (2006).
25. Id. § 36o8(e) (20o6) (instructing the Secretary of Housing and Urban
Development "affirmatively to further" the goal of fair housing).
26. 558 F.2d 1283 (7th Cir. 1977) [hereinafter Arlington Heights II].
27. Id. at 1289.
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a similar holding regarding § 3604.28 Today, if a plaintiff suing under § 3604
makes a prima facie showing that a "decision . . . 'makes housing options
significantly more restrictive for members of a protected group than for persons
outside that group,"' 29 the defendant must prove both that his decision
furthered a legitimate interest and that no less discriminatory alternative
existed. 0
Second, several federal courts also have held that an anti-disparate impact
requirement attaches under § 36o8(e)(5). Section 36o8(e)(5) requires that HUD
"administer the [housing] programs.., in a manner affirmatively to further the
policies of this subchapter."3' In Shannon v. HUD, the Third Circuit held that
this provision obligates HUD to apply an anti-disparate impact assessment to
its comprehensive housing agenda in a given city.32 Following Shannon, then-
Judge Breyer of the First Circuit held § 36o8(e)(5) to require that HUD
reallocate its entire set of housing grants in Boston to minimize racial clustering
in poor areas, 33 and another federal court used § 3608 to enjoin suburban
housing authorities from applying residency preferences to Section 8 waiting
lists.3 4 In Thompson v. HUD, which will be explored at length below, the district
court went even one step further. The court agreed with Judge Breyer that
§ 3608 requires HUD to "'assess negatively those aspects of a proposed course of
28. Nat'l Fair Hous. Alliance, Inc. v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 208 F. Supp. 2d 46, 58
(D.D.C. 2002) ("Every Circuit Court except the District of Columbia Circuit has
held that disparate impact claims are cognizable under the FHA.").
29. Hallmark Developers, Inc. v. Fulton County, 466 F.3d 1276, 1286 (i1th Cir. 2006)
(quoting Hous. Investors, Inc. v. City of Clanton, 68 F. Supp. 2d 1287, 1298 (M.D.
Ala. 1999)).
30. See, e.g., Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126, 146 (3d Cir. 1977). Although
the precise analysis differs from case to case, most federal courts deciding § 3604
cases now apply the tests developed by the Second Circuit in NAACP v. Town of
Huntington to decide if there was disparate impact and to decide whether the
housing policy in question furthered "a legitimate, bona fide governmental
interest." NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926, 936 (2d Cir. 1988).
31. 42 U.S.C. § 36o8(e)(5) (2006). "The policies of this subchapter" include the
mandate "to provide, within constitutional limits, for fair housing throughout the
United States." Id. § 36Ol.
32. Shannon v. HUD, 436 F.2d 809, 819-22 (3d Cir. 1970).
33. See NAACP v. Sec'y of Hous. & Urban Dev., 817 F.2d 149, 156 (1st Cir. 1987)
(holding that § 36o8(e)(5) required HUD to "'consider [the] effect of [every HUD
grant] on the racial and socio-economic composition of the surrounding area,'
to "assess negatively those aspects of a proposed course of action that would
further limit the supply of genuinely open housing and to assess positively those
aspects of a proposed course of action that would increase that supply"
(alterations in original) (quoting Anderson v. City of Alpharetta, 737 F.2d 1530,
1537 (llth Cir. 1984))).
34. See Langlois v. Abington Hous. Auth., 234 F. Supp. 2d 33 (D. Mass. 2002).
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action that would further [entrench segregated housing]"'35 but held that the
anti-disparate impact mandate reaches "beyond the city borders." 6
Both § 3604 and § 3608 cases apply a conception of racial justice under
which fairness is achieved when actors in the housing market minimize the
unnecessary side effects of their actions on racial minorities. Justice, in other
words, means preventing unnecessary harms. The § 3608 cases go farther than
the § 3604 cases because they require government actors not only to reduce the
disparate impacts of one-off policies but also to undertake more comprehensive
evaluations of their agendas and to choose the policies that (all else equal) are
most beneficial for minority groups.
B. The Shortcomings of Housing Law's Current Normative Frameworks
The normative frameworks that underlie federal housing laws in the United
States-antidiscrimination, remediation, and mitigation of disparate impact-
are all insufficient to ensure racial justice. In countless cities across America,
neighborhoods are defined by entrenched poverty, underperforming schools, a
dearth of jobs, and a disproportionate share of racial minorities. These
neighborhoods, America's racial ghettos, are an affront to liberal notions of
fairness. Racial ghettos systematically deprive groups of opportunities to enjoy
society's resources, and they advance no other societal benefit. An adequate
theory of justice must recognize racial ghettoization itself as a substantive
injustice to be corrected, thereby accomplishing what antidiscrimination,
remediation, and anti-disparate impact theories cannot alone.
i. The Persistence of Racial Ghettoization
Although housing conditions for African-American families have improved
considerably since the 196os, particularly for black middle-class families3 7 there
still is deep racial unfairness in the U.S. housing market.
First, racial segregation remains an issue. Three-quarters of all metropolitan
areas in 2000 were either "segregated" or "hypersegregated" according to
analysts at the Brookings Institution." The average white suburban family lives
35. Thompson v. HUD, 348 F. Supp. 2d 398, 458 (D. Md. 2005) (quoting NAACP, 817
F.2d at 155).
36. Id. at 458.
37. ORLANDO PATTERSON, THE ORDEAL OF INTEGRATION: PROGRESS AND
RESENTMENT IN AMERICA'S "RACIAL" CRISIS (1997) (documenting the growth of
the black middle class since the 196os and the improvement in resources and
opportunities for black middle class households).
38. EDWARD L. GLAESER & JACOB L. VIGDOR, BROOKINGS INST., RACIAL SEGREGATION
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in a neighborhood that is 85% white and 15% minority. The average black
suburban family lives in a neighborhood that is over 50% minority.3 9
Second, even more alarming than the prevalence of racial segregation is the
strong correlation, especially in metropolitan areas, between neighborhood
racial composition and neighborhood poverty level. In 2000, African-
Americans were the strong majority, constituting 60% or more of the
population, in nearly half of the country's "high poverty" areas,40 which
numbered around 3000.4' In other words: The ghettos are, disproportionately,
black. According to Paul Jargowsky, a poor black person in the United States is
three times more likely than a poor white person to grow up in a neighborhood
of "extreme" poverty.42 Even a middle-class black person today lives in a
neighborhood with a poverty level up to 42% higher than that where his white
counterpart lives.43 These statistics show that American neighborhoods not only
are divided according to race but also according to racial class. The
phenomenon of racial ghettoization is apparent and has worsened in recent
years.
44
39. LISA ROBINSON & ANDREW GRANT-THOMAS, RACE, PLACE, AND HOME: A CIVIL
RIGHTS AND METROPOLITAN OPPORTUNITY AGENDA 20 fig.I.5 (2004), available at
http://www.civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/metro/Race PlaceHome.pdf.
40. Id. at 23 (referring to neighborhoods with rates of poverty of 3oo/o or more).
41. Alan Berube, Concentrated Poverty in America: An Overview, in THE FED. RESERVE
Sys. & THE BROOKINGS INST., THE ENDURING CHALLENGE OF CONCENTRATED
POVERTY IN AMERICA: CASE STUDIES FROM COMMUNITIES ACROSS THE U.S. 7
(20o8), available at http://www.brookings.edu/-/media/Files/rc/reports/20o8/
1024_concentrated-poverty/024.concentrated-poverty.pdf (showing that there
were 2500 "extreme poverty neighborhoods" in the year 2000, in which poverty
rates were 40% or higher).
42. PAUL JARGOWSKY, BROOKINGS INST., STUNNING PROGRESS, HIDDEN PROBLEMS:
THE DRAMATIC DECLINE OF CONCENTRATED POVERTY IN THE 1990S lo fig.8
(2003).
43. ROBINSON & GRANT-THOMAS, supra note 39, at 22.
44. Since 2000, metropolitan areas have seen an increase in rates of highly
concentrated poverty, as have working-class suburbs. See ELIZABETH KNEEBONE &
ALAN BERUBE, BROOKINGS INST., REVERSAL OF FORTUNE: A NEW LOOK AT
CONCENTRATED POVERTY IN THE 2000S 10, 16 (2008). These trends mean that
racially concentrated poverty has risen as well given that minority residents are
the primary occupants of poor urban neighborhoods.
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2. The Exceptional Immorality of Racial Ghettos
From the standpoint of liberal political theory,45 racial ghettoization is
problematic first and foremost because it perpetuates racial subordination.
Indeed, many social processes besides ghettoization also contribute to racial
subordination: political elections that yield an underrepresentation of
minorities in government; admissions processes that yield an
underrepresentation of minorities in universities; and capitalist markets that
produce an income distribution in which minorities are in the lowest
percentiles. Why, if at all, is racial ghettoization different from these other
forces? Does it demand a separate theory of justice?
This Note argues that in at least three ways, racial ghettos are uniquely
problematic for the liberal state, and racial ghettoization therefore demands a
specific theory of justice. These reasons are: (i) racial ghettos have a deeper link
with racial caste than any other social process; (2) racial ghettos systematically
deprive minorities of opportunities while promoting no other societal value;
and (3) racial ghettos can be eliminated without the use of racial quotas.
Before unpacking the aforementioned reasons that racial ghettoization is
exceptional, all of which trace back to the phenomenon of "racial caste," it is
first necessary to define the concept of "racial caste." Racial caste refers to a
societal arrangement in which hierarchies of fortune-political power,
economic wealth, and social status-correlate with race. In any democracy,
hierarchies of fortune raise concerns about whether there is a sufficient degree
of political or economic equality. But when hierarchies also are correlated with
race, this arrangement damages the rights of the individual and the character of
the democratic polity in profound ways. From the standpoint of the individual,
racial hierarchies breed stigma, corrupting a person's sense of self-worth 46 and
forcing him to compete in a world that prejudges him as undeserving. Racial
45. When this Note refers to "liberal political theory" or the "liberal state," it is
referring primarily to the work of Ronald Dworkin and John Rawls. Dworkin's
political theory begins with the normative premise that all human beings must be
regarded as free actors, responsible for their personal life choices. Accordingly,
Dworkin contends, the goal of the liberal, democratic state should be to structure
its laws and institutions to ensure that every individual is afforded that equal
respect and concern. See RONALD DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE: THE THEORY
AND PRACTICE OF EQUALITY (2000); RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS
SERIOUSLY (1977). Rawls's political theory is similarly built upon a normative
commitment to basic liberties for all persons. For Rawls, the liberal democratic
order will only be just if it provides every individual with an equal claim to an
adequate scheme of rights and opportunities. See JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL
LIBERALISM (1993).
46. john a. powell, Structural Racism: Building upon the Insights of John Calmore, 86
N.C. L. REV. 791, 813 (2008) ("The 'self is contextual and relational. For example,
'white' identity derives much of its substance through its negation of the racialized
other. The racial meaning that is in part a product of our institutional
arrangements plays a role in the construction of our selves....").
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hierarchies also create nonrandom deprivations of opportunity given that one's
probability of being poor is a function of his race, which is unfair both for the
unborn child and for the extant racial group whose incoming members are
destined to be disadvantaged. From the perspective of the democratic polity,
racial caste frustrates the possibility for collective association and citizenship. As
Michael Walzer explains, basic inequalities between people due to talent,
income, or prestige are natural and typically not fatal to the polity. When a
social system is ordered, however, such that having an inborn trait such as race
entails enjoying other advantages, this pattern erodes the mutual respect that is
the necessary foundation of democratic citizenship. 47
Racial ghettos are by no means alone in contributing to the problematic
phenomenon of racial caste. Numerous processes in the economic market,
political market, and other societal spheres also produce racial hierarchies. For
instance, as mentioned above, political elections that happen to produce an
underrepresentation of minorities in government, or admissions processes that
happen to produce an underrepresentation of minorities in universities, also
foster a racial underclass. Even when these processes operate fairly and on the
basis of merit, i.e., even when they are completely devoid of actors who
discriminate, they still can perpetuate racial subordination by yielding
underrepresentation for minority groups.
Nonetheless, this Note argues that racial ghettos can be distinguished from
the other mechanisms that cause disparate impacts for minority groups. For
three reasons, individually and especially in combination, racial ghettos are
uniquely illegitimate in their fostering of racial caste.
First, racial ghettos bear a deeper, more intimate link with racial caste than
any other societal process or institution. This is because a person's
neighborhood-besides perhaps one's family and one's genes-is the most
important influence on his or her life opportunities. Neighborhoods determine
the education that a person will receive at an early age, 4s the jobs that will be
available to that person as he grows older,49 and the social networks to which he
will be exposed. Neighborhoods shape one's identity and sense of place in the
world: "The structures we inhabit not only distribute material benefits and
burdens across society, but also distribute meaning, which in turn shapes ...
attitudes and influences the formation of ... identities." 5° Thus, unlike other
47. MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE 277 (1983).
48. MARGERY AUSTIN TURNER & ALAN BERUBE, BROOKINGS INST., VIBRANT
NEIGHBORHOODS, SUCCESSFUL SCHOOLS: WHAT THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT CAN
Do To FOSTER BOTH 2 (2009) ("High rates of student poverty, residential
instability, neighborhood crime and distress, aging facilities, and limited fiscal
capacity all undermine the performance of public schools in poor
neighborhoods.").
49. See generally John F. Kain, Housing Segregation, Negro Employment, and
Metropolitan Decentralization, 82 Q.J. ECON. 175 (1968) (explaining how job
availability varies by neighborhood).
50. powell, supra note 46, at 811.
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determinants of socioeconomic status, neighborhoods affect nearly every
societal mechanism that influences a person's opportunities.
There is convincing evidence that in the United States, racial ghettos are
one of the primary causal determinants of the black underclass today.'
Beginning in elementary school, African-American children born in poor urban
communities are deprived of educational resources and set on a course toward
low academic achievement.2 Between 199o and 2000, the average black child in
the United States attended a school that was 65% poor, while the average white
child attended a school that was 30% poor. 3 In the employment market, the
dearth of jobs in ghetto neighborhoods pushes up the long-term
unemployment rate for African-Americans and encourages many to drop out of
the job market altogether. 54 In central cities today, nearly one in two African-
American adults is not even in the labor force.5 5 Finally, the high incidence of
crime in ghetto areas is another nail in the coffin of opportunity. Children who
51. See, e.g., PATRICK SHARKEY, PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, NEIGHBORHOODS AND
THE BLACK-WHITE MOBILITY GAP 11 (2009) (finding that neighborhood poverty
is a significant causal determinant of the "extremely high rates of downward
mobility" of black children raised in poor neighborhoods); id. at io-i6, 20-21;
David M. Cutler & Edward L. Glaeser, Are Ghettos Good or Bad?, 112 Q.J. EcON.
827, 828 (1997) ("[W~e find strong, consistent evidence that black outcomes are
substantially worse (both in absolute terms and relative to whites) in racially
segregated cities than they are in more integrated cities. As segregation increases,
blacks have lower high school graduation rates, are more likely to be idle (neither
in school nor working), earn less income, and are more likely to become single
mothers.").
52. SHARKEY, supra note 51; see also Christopher Jencks & Susan E. Mayer, The Social
Consequences of Growing Up in a Poor Neighborhood, in INNER-CITY POVERTY IN
THE UNITED STATES 177 (Laurence E. Lynn, Jr. & Michael G.H. McGeary eds.,
1990).
53. JOHN R. LOGAN, LEWIS MUMFORD CTR. FOR COMPARATIVE URBAN & REG'L
RESEARCH, CHOOSING SEGREGATION: RACIAL IMBALANCE IN AMERICAN PUBLIC
SCHOOLS, 1990-2000, at 19 (2002), available at http://www.eric.ed.gov:8o/
ERICDocs/data/ericdocs2sql/content-storage-o1/oooool 9 b/8o/la/a2/6f.pdf.
54. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DEP'T OF LABOR, LABOR FORCE STATISTICS
FROM THE CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY 193-94 (2009),
http://www.bls.gov/cps/cpsaat3.pdf (showing that in 2009, 35% of the black male
population sixteen years and older was not in the labor force, compared to 27% of
the comparable white male population); CHRISTIAN E. WELLER, CTR. FOR AM.
PROGRESS, ECONOMIC SNAPSHOT FOR JULY 2009, at 1 (2009), available at
http://www.americanprogress.orglissues/2009/o7/pdf/julos econ-snapshot.pdf
(showing that, as of July 2009, the unemployment rate among African-Americans
was 14.7%, nearly 50% higher than for the nation as a whole).
55. ALGERNON AUSTIN, ECON. POLICY INST., ECONOMIC GAINS OF THE 1990S
OVERTURNED FOR AFRICAN-AMERICANS FROM 2000-07, at 6 (2008),
http://epi.3cdn.net/f2o5db387e4l8862d6-c5m6bhwoj.pdf (showing that in 2007,
the black employment rate in central cities was only 56%).
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are exposed to violence at young ages demonstrate high tendencies to engage in
violent behavior themselves. 6 Families continually exposed to such violence
often crumble.
5 7
These features of the racial ghetto combine to produce an identifiable and
persistent black underclass in America's cities."8 Eradicating ghettos would have
an exponential effect on racial caste relative to fixing any singular process that
disparately impacts minorities. The sheer strength of the causal relationship
between racial ghettos and racial subordination makes the moral problem of the
racial ghetto distinct.
The second reason why racial ghettoization raises exceptional problems for
liberal society is that it facilitates subordination for minority groups while
promoting absolutely no other societal benefit or set of rights. Compared to the
other processes not driven by animus but contributing to racial subordination,
racial ghettoization stands apart; those processes, at least arguably, further
collective goods and individual liberties. For instance, fairly designed
employment tests that happen to select disproportionately for white persons
and thus disparately impact African-Americans nonetheless may further the
societal benefit of economic productivity. These tests also promote the
individual liberties of business owners, enabling them to choose the most
qualified workers available. Political elections that end up yielding an
underrepresentation of minorities in government similarly can be said to
promote a broader societal good, that of democratic fairness, as well as the
individual liberties of voters. Similar arguments can be made for university
admissions processes, which both enrich society's aggregate human capital and
advance the rights of individuals to be selected based on academic merit; stiff
penalties for criminal offenses, which both protect the community and provide
retributive justice to victims of crimes; and competitive allocations of
government contracts, which both maximize collective productivity and reward
entrepreneurial merit.
Racial ghettos, however, perpetuate racial castes while producing no other
collective good and advancing no other individual rights. There is nothing
beneficial for the collective polity, either from a utilitarian perspective or from a
deontological perspective, that is achieved by having neighborhoods stratified
according to racial class. On the contrary, racial ghettos drive down the overall
economic activity within a city, decrease the employment rate, and increase
aggregate crime levels.59 With respect to individual rights, there is also no
56. Expert Report on Remedies Phase: Testimony of Margery Austin Turner & Xavier
de Souza Briggs at 3, Thompson v. HUD, No. 95CVoo3o9 (D. Md. Aug. 19, 2005).
57. See generally id.
58. See WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, WHEN WORK DISAPPEARS: THE WORLD OF THE
NEW URBAN POOR (1996).
59. Id. at 14-54 (documenting the low levels of economic activity and depressed
employment rates associated with racial ghettos and the effect of ghettoization on
cities); see also Ruth D. Peterson & Lauren J. Krivo, Segregated Spatial Locations,
495
YALE LAW & POLICY REVIEW
inherent connection between racial ghettos and personal liberty. While many
middle-class families, both white and black, choose not to live in the ghetto and
thereby express their free will to avoid ghettos, these families still would be able
to choose from a diverse array of residential options in a world with no ghettos
at all, including the option of living in a racially concentrated middle-class
neighborhood.6" In short, the existence of the racial ghetto does not expand
freedom in any meaningful way. Some might argue that many African-
Americans do choose to live in contemporary ghettos and that such a choice
would be removed paternalistically if racial ghettos were eliminated.6 Though
this claim might be descriptively accurate, the choice to live and raise one's
children in a ghetto is not an informed preference that society should deem
morally compelling.6
The third and final reason that racial ghettos pose unique normative
problems for liberal society is that they can be fixed without invoking
troublesome racial quotas. In many other social spheres where minorities are
underrepresented, such as schools, jobs, and elected offices, a direct expansion
of opportunities for minorities, or "affirmative action" measures, requires the
use of soft or hard quotas. In turn, society must address some difficult
questions. How many slots should be reserved for minorities in order to yield
an adequate representation? What mechanisms can society use to allocate scarce
benefits to minorities without creating a sense of racial inferiority? And how can
society make sure that race does not become the exclusive determining factor in
allocating resources, but that it plays a role? None of these questions has an easy
Race-Ethnic Composition, and Neighborhood Violent Crime, 623 ANNALS AM.
ACAD. POL. & SOc. Scl. 93, 100-01 (2009) (showing the disproportionately high
crime rates associated with racially concentrated urban communities).
60. Many scholars have argued that blacks and whites should have the right to choose
to live in nonintegrated arrangements for economic, individual-rights, and group-
rights reasons. See RICHARD EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS 68-69 (1992) (arguing
that voluntary residential segregation is economically efficient); Brian Patrick
Larkin, Note, The Forty-Year "First Step": The Fair Housing Act as an Incomplete
Tool for Suburban Integration, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1617, 1636 (2007) (arguing that
African-Americans should have the right to live in all-black or mostly black
neighborhoods to gain political empowerment as a group). Even assuming that
these arguments have merit and that whites and blacks should be able to choose
nonintegration, the elimination of racial ghettos would not in and of itself deprive
anyone of the right to choose nonintegration. Whites and blacks could still choose
to remain segregated in a world with no racial ghettos; only now, they would be
choosing to sort themselves into separate high-opportunity neighborhoods.
61. See infra notes 75-78 and accompanying text.
62. This Note concedes that one individual freedom that the elimination of racial
ghettos would eradicate is the choice of African-American households to live in a
racially concentrated ghetto. Because ghettos are by definition neighborhoods with
limited opportunities, the choice to subject oneself, one's family, and one's
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answer; courts and policymakers have debated for decades how quotas should
be used to expand opportunities.
63
Meanwhile, fixing the problem of racial ghettoization raises none of the
typical issues surrounding affirmative action because residency in high-
opportunity neighborhoods is not a scarce benefit that needs protection
through quotas. Unlike enrollment in a university or employment at a firm
where slots are inherently limited, living outside the ghetto is an opportunity
that can be made available to all persons, at least over the course of time as
sufficient government resources are made available. Schools and firms are
closed universes, but high-opportunity neighborhoods are not. Society can
facilitate the movement of ghetto residents into communities of opportunity
without having to reserve any "spots" for minorities or exclude any
nonminorities. Accordingly, the perpetuation of racial ghettos is even more
unjustified than the continuation of most societal processes that facilitate
subordination, because ghettos can be eradicated without invoking the messy
apparatus of quotas.
3. Why Current Theories of Justice in Housing Law Fall Short
All three theories of justice that currently animate U.S. housing law-
antidiscrimination, compensation, and anti-disparate impact-are normatively
insufficient because all three fail to confront directly the exceptional injustice of
the racial ghetto.
Antidiscrimination theory posits race-neutral treatment as the ultimate
societal good but does not consider racially concentrated ghettos, if produced
through fair, nondiscriminatory practices, to be inherently unjust. Housing
claims that are brought under the text of the FHA, which applies the
antidiscrimination framework, thus turn on the racial animus of the public or
private actor but not on the existence of the racial ghetto.64
Compensation theory posits race-neutral treatment alongside remediation
as the ultimate societal good and so only considers racially concentrated ghettos
as substantively unjust if they are the products of discriminatory government
practices. Housing litigation brought under the Equal Protection Clause, which
is driven by the compensation rationale, turns on whether specific evidence of
racial discrimination by a government actor exists. It is no surprise that, over
several decades, only a handful of the country's racial ghettos-about fifteen-
63. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 505 (1989)
(invalidating a city's policy to reserve 30% of the city's construction contracts for
minority-owned businesses, claiming that these set-asides were "rigid racial
preferences"); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (barring
overt racial quotas in college admissions but allowing race to be used as a so-
called plus factor).
64. See supra notes 9, 14-17 and accompanying text.
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have begun to undergo deconstruction through the vehicle of the Equal
Protection Clause lawsuit.6"
Anti-disparate impact theory posits the mitigation of harsh side effects of
societal processes to be the ultimate good, but only when such mitigation can
be achieved without overly compromising other societal values. Plaintiffs suing
under an anti-disparate impact application of the FHA cannot allege the general
unfairness of the racial ghetto as such but must target a particular societal
practice that produces the ghetto.66 At times, such a distinct process or practice
will not be identifiable.67 Moreover, anti-disparate impact theory is concerned
with reducing disproportionate harms for racial groups but only up to a certain
point. In anti-disparate impact lawsuits brought under the FHA, courts often
defer to defendants, requiring them only to make a showing of "legitimate"
goals furthered by their housing policy in order to prevail. 6' Requiring only a
"legitimate" interest to justify the continuation of housing policies that cause
disparate impacts for minorities is simply not equal to a theory of justice that
morally condemns the racial ghetto as such. Several practitioners contend that
§ 3608 of the FHA does require more than anti-disparate impact policies,
because the purpose of the provision is to dismantle racial ghettos at whatever
cost.6 9 This Notes endorses a broader of reading of § 3608, 70 and it ultimately
suggests that § 3608 be the statutory hook for the antighettoization policy it
proposes.7' Nonetheless, because the prevailing approach in federal courts today
is to treat § 3608 as an anti-disparate impact provision,72 it is first necessary to
flesh out what a more robust theory of racial justice for housing law would
entail.
65. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
66. Seng & Caruso, supra note lo, at 240 ("Congress could further expand the burden-
shifting devices used in disparate impact cases [under the FHA] to those cases
where there is no policy or practice but where the housing has a disproportionate
number of nonminority occupants and the housing is located in an area with a
large minority concentration.").
67. E.g., Simms v. First Gibraltar Bank, 83 F.3d 1546 (5th Cir. 1996).
68. E.g., Langlois v. Abington Hous. Auth., 207 F.3d 43, 51 (1st Cir. 2000) (holding that
there is no statutory violation if a "demonstrated disparate impact in housing [is]
justified by a legitimate and substantial goal of the measure in question"); NAACP
v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926,939 (2d Cir. 1988).
69. See Florence Wagman Roisman, Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing in Regional
Housing Markets: The Baltimore Public Housing Desegregation Litigation, 42 WAKE
FOREST L. REv. 333, 368-71, 389 (2007).
70. The legislative history supports the beyond-anti-disparate-impact reading. See id.
at 371-88.
71. See infra note 174 and accompany text.
72. See supra notes 32-36, 66-68.
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C. Antighettoization as the Correct Normative Framework
A new theory of justice for housing would extend beyond those currently
recognized in our housing statutes and jurisprudence and would posit the
exceptional immorality of racial ghettoization as a substantive injustice
deserving an immediate remedy. Call it "antighettoization" theory. Rather than
neutral treatment, compensation of victims, or the tweaking of current
practices to ensure that they are least harmful, this new theory of justice would
conceptualize the elimination of the racial ghetto as an ultimate outcome
demanded in housing markets.
A few questions and comments about this new theory of justice are in
order.
First, why is it an improvement over outstanding theories? An
antighettoization theory of justice is stronger than those that animate our
housing law today because it posits the outcome of racial ghettoization, rather
than the processes in the housing market that contribute to such an outcome, as
the unacceptable moral wrong. Even in situations where private or public actors
do not exhibit racial animus, where the government has not discriminated
historically, and where defendants can show that every social process that
perpetuates the ghetto has a "legitimate" justification, an antighettoization
theory would condemn the existence of the racialized ghetto.
Second, what corrective actions would an antighettoization theory
demand? In Part II, this Note presents in detail a national administrative
program that could be implemented to carry antighettoization theory into
effect. Suffice it to say here that the central response demanded by an
antighettoization theory is a race-conscious policy, undertaken by the federal
government, that provides minority residents of ghettos with access to housing
in high-opportunity communities. The specific program suggested by this Note,
involving "opportunity-housing vouchers," would provide new subsidies
through HUD's Section 8 program to allow for apartment rentals in
communities of opportunity. The opportunity-housing vouchers program
surely is not the only conceivable policy that would encompass an
antighettoization theory of justice, and this Note advocates for this policy for
reasons beyond its normative foundation.7 3 But what any policy to implement
antighettoization must do is provide residents of ghettos an assurance of living
in a community of opportunity.
Third, why is it logical and normatively defensible to propose a theory of
justice that is particular to the housing market? Why not extend the
antighettoization framework proposed here to all forums that engender racial
subordination? For instance, in the job market, where anti-disparate impact
theory currently governs under Title VII, why not extend antighettoization
theory and declare that the racial concentration of persons in minimum wage
jobs is per se unjust? Why not demand an affirmative action policy in the job
73. See infra notes 75-78 and accompanying text.
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market along the lines of the "opportunity-housing vouchers" program, which
would help minorities become employed in higher-wage jobs? Or in the
household-income spectrum, why not extend antighettoization theory to
declare that the racial concentration of families in the lowest income brackets is
per se unjust? And why not implement a race-based progressive income tax to
reallocate income across groups?
With regard to these questions, this Note has shown that, because of the
exceptional illegitimacy of the racial ghetto, it is both logical and defensible to
design a theory of racial justice that is limited to the housing context. As
explained above, racial ghettos not only perpetuate caste, they also raise unique
normative concerns because they bear a deeply intimate link to racial
subordination, promote no other societal benefit or set of rights, and can be
eliminated without the use of racial quotas. Thus, while one surely could argue
that other social practices merit stronger theories of justice, theories that go
further than antidiscrimination, remediation, or disparate impact reduction,
those arguments need not be addressed here in order to accept
antighettoization theory as an appropriate, even if exclusive, normative
framework for the housing market.
Finally, why is antighettoization the ideal theory of justice for the housing
market rather than a theory that posits the expansion of residential choices for
low-income minorities as the ultimate good? Under antighettoization theory,
justice would be served either by a program that helped low-income minorities
exit the ghetto or by a program that transformed the ghetto into a high-
opportunity neighborhood and thereafter gave minorities more residential
choice. This Note argues for the former approach as the best means of realizing
antighettoization theory from a policy standpoint.74 But, we need to take a step
back and consider whether a theory of justice should be satisfied with either
type of program. In other words, is the normative injustice really the existence
of racially concentrated ghettos or is it the inability of ghetto residents to choose
their own fates, including the option of remaining in their current
neighborhood but having access to greater opportunities?
Some have argued that a "choice-based" theory of justice should anchor
housing law.75 Under the choice-based theory, justice is understood as
demanding not just the right to live in any community of opportunity, but the
right to live in the community of opportunity you choose, even if this means
staying rooted in the ghetto and having the ghetto be transformed. Part of the
rationale behind this theory is that minorities should not be forced to move to
74. See infra Part II.
75. See, e.g., Larkin, supra note 60; Michael R. Tein, Comment, The Devaluation of
Nonwhite Community in Remedies for Subsidized Housing Discrimination, 14o U.
PA. L. REV. 1463, 1496 (1992) (arguing for "'the right of people to remain
indefinitely where they are"' and that "forcing dispersal [of blacks] among the
larger white community is itself discriminatory" (quoting ROBERT F. FORMAN,
BLACK GHETTOS, WHITE GHETTOS, AND SLUMS 46 (1971))).
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largely white neighborhoods in order to experience society's socioeconomic
opportunities. 6
This Note advocates for antighettoization theory rather than a choice-based
theory as the correct framework for housing law for two reasons. First,
antighettoization promotes individual rights in a manner more consistent with
how rights are protected in liberal democracies generally. Under an
antighettoization framework, individual rights connote one's ability to live in a
community of opportunity, thereby sharing in society's coveted resources.
Throughout the liberal state-the job market, political market, and education
system-individual rights similarly confer the ability to access societal
resources.7' Under the choice-based theory of justice, meanwhile, individual
rights are understood as conferring access to specific life outcomes willed by the
individual. Again, the choice-based framework posits that a person has the right
not just to live in any community of opportunity, but also the right to live in
the specific community of opportunity that he or she wills (even if a revitalized
ghetto does not yet exist). If applied throughout the liberal state, this
conception of rights would be transformative and unworkable. For instance, the
right to higher education would entail the individual right to design a new
preferred university. Moreover, the fact that antighettoization theory expects
individuals to sacrifice their ideal preferences is not fatal. The liberal state
constantly expects individuals to make personal sacrifices of effort, of time, or
of preferences to compete for society's opportunities. The requirement of
sacrifice does not deplete justice; it is what a just provision of opportunities
most commonly entails.
7
Second, antighettoization is the preferable normative framework for
housing law because a choice-based theory runs the risk of endorsing racial
enclaves. Under a choice-based theory, one central reason why minorities must
enjoy the right to choose living in the ghetto is that all persons should be able-
if they desire-to live in a neighborhood where they constitute the racial
majority.7 9 In other words, a choice-based theory posits that living in a physical
space where one's racial identity is reified around her is an individual right the
76. See, e.g., J. Phillip Thompson, Beyond Moralizing, in A WAY OUT 60, 66 (Joshua
Cohen et al. eds., 2003) ("I hope that instead of telling poor blacks that they
cannot afford to live with one another . . . some kind of democratic and
empowering process can be envisioned in which African Americans might be able
to utilize their churches, clubs, community organizations, and other social
networks to promote their own vision of how they want to live...."); Tein, supra
note 75.
77. Equal access to societal opportunities and rights is again the central focus of the
work of Dworkin and Rawls. See supra note 45.
78. Accord Owen Fiss, What Should Be Done for Those Who Have Been Left Behind, in
A WAY OUT, supra note 76, at 3, 34 (explaining that "[cihoosing to move entails a
sacrifice" but that sacrifice is a reasonable feature of a deconcentration policy).
79. See Thompson, supra note 76.
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government should support. The problem with this rationale is that it
contradicts one of the orienting philosophies of liberal democracies; it endorses
segregated living spaces rather than diverse, open ones. Though democratic
governments do and should provide minority groups with support to cultivate
their cultural resources, tying such support to geographical locations would
create physical islands of exclusion.
In sum, antighettoization is a powerful improvement over the current
frameworks animating our housing law. It conceives of the racial ghetto as the
substantive injustice to be corrected, and it calls for affirmative-action style
programs that would enable racial minorities now confined to the ghetto to
move to communities of opportunity. Antighettoization theory works as a
theory of justice specific to the housing market; given the exceptional
immorality of the racial ghetto, it is logically defensible to promote
antighettoization but also to argue that it should be limited to housing rather
than extended to other societal forums that cause disparate impacts. And
finally, antighettoization is a more attractive means of ensuring justice in the
housing market than a choice-based theory. Antighettoization conceives of
individual rights in a manner more appropriate for, and in harmony with,
liberal democracies, and it avoids facilitating minority-group rights in a way
that would encourage geographic segregation.
II. APPLYING THE THEORY: OPPORTUNITY-HoUSING VOUCHERS
To implement the antighettoization theory of justice for housing law that
this Note proposes, the United States should reform Section 8 to include a new
"opportunity-housing vouchers" program. In Section II.A, this Note explains
what an opportunity-housing vouchers program would entail and why it is
preferable, from a public policy perspective, to other programs that might
advance antighettoization. Granted, past efforts to deconcentrate the ghetto
through voucher-based programs have not always worked. The congressionally
authorized Moving to Opportunity (MTO) program from the 199os most
significantly failed to produce lasting residential mobility or socioeconomic
gains for most families that participated."s In Section II.B, however, this Note
demonstrates that an opportunity-housing vouchers program can be designed
to avoid the pitfalls of previous housing mobility initiatives and to improve
upon the MTO model. Drawing on the remedy requested by the plaintiffs in a
recent housing lawsuit, this Note shows that deconcentration can be achieved at
the administrative level and that it can be done well.
A. The Proposal: "Opportunity-Housing Vouchers" Within Section 8
The central policy proposal in this Note is that antighettoization theory be
implemented through a new opportunity-housing vouchers program. The
program would use the architecture of Section 8 to provide rental assistance on
80. See infra notes 113-114, 121-123 and accompanying text.
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a national scale, but, unlike Section 8, it would explicitly promote racial
deconcentration as its objective.
To understand why opportunity vouchers are necessary for realizing the
antighettoization principle, it is first necessary to explain why Section 8 alone is
insufficient. Section 8 is the primary "household-based" rental assistance
program in the U.S. for low-income individuals."' Government benefits attach
in the form of housing subsidies for families to use in the housing market,
rather than in the form of physical structures to be used for public housing.
Section 8 is funded by Congress and is operated by HUD in conjunction with
local public housing authorities (PHA). Under current law, a Section 8 recipient
can use her voucher for any rental unit in the private market nation-wide, as
long as the unit conforms to price and quality requirements established by
HUD.2 The portability of Section 8 vouchers is an enforceable right of the
recipient."s
Although Section 8 vouchers are portable in theory, they fail to be so in
practice. The majority of Section 8 recipients end up using their vouchers not to
move to high-opportunity neighborhoods but to remain where they are
currently located, which is largely in ghettos or ghetto-like areas . 4 The primary
reasons why Section 8 vouchers are not truly portable are well-documented:
low-income families lack information about housing opportunities in the
suburbs; suburban landlords harbor prejudices against tenants who accept
government assistance; and there is a shortage of housing units that meet
HUD's fair-market-rent specifications in middle-class neighborhoods."s Thus,
although one of the self-declared aims of the Section 8 program upon creation
81. U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., Housing Choice Vouchers Fact Sheet,
http://www.hud.gov/offices/pih/programs/hcv/about/factsheet.cfm (last visited
July 1, 2010).
82. 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(o),(r) (Supp. V 2006); 24 C.F.R. § 982,353(b) (2009).
83. Philip D. Tegeler, Michael L. Hanley & Judith Liben, Transforming Section 8: Using
Federal Housing Subsidies- To Promote Individual Housing Choice and
Desegregation, 30 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 451, 457 (1995).
84. Rodger Climaco et al., Portability Moves in the Housing Choice Voucher Program
(HCVP), 1998-2005, CITYSCAPE, 2008, at 1, 11-12, available at http://
www.huduser.org/periodicals/cityscpe/vohonumi/chi.pdf (finding that "[o]f all
3.4 million households ever in the federal housing voucher program from 1998 to
2005," a mere "8.9 percent used their voucher to exercise a portability move to
another jurisdiction" and that in 2005, only 1.6% of voucher holders made a
"portability move").
85. Tegeler et al., supra note 83, at 466-67 (explaining that a "shortage of participating
landlords outside of the urban area, a lack of information about suburban rental
listings[,] ... transportation obstacles, and a shortage of apartments outside the
city" all contribute to the fact that 96% of minority residents in Rochester, New
York, a sample city studied by the authors, use their Section 8 subsidies within city
limits); see also id. at 478-83 (describing how these same obstacles limit use of
Section 8 vouchers outside of urban areas in areas across the United States).
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was to reduce "the isolation of income groups within communities" and to
increase "the diversity and vitality of neighborhoods," 6 the program currently
is failing to achieve these goals in countless American cities.
87
A new opportunity-housing vouchers program constructed to effectuate
antighettoization theory would build on the model of Section 8 (and could
operate as a subpart of Section 8) but would be designed to ensure that
participants use rent subsidies to exit the ghetto. s8
Two design features would distinguish the opportunity-housing vouchers
program from Section 8. First, the new program would provide a rental subsidy
that can be used only in "communities of opportunity." In turn, "communities
of opportunity" would be residential areas with a sufficient amount of job
availability, high-performing schools, low crime levels, and other indicators of
neighborhood health s9 One creative idea would be to link the demarcation of
86. Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-383, §
ioi(c)(6), 88 Stat. 633 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 5301(c)(6) (2006)).
87. Mark A. Malaspina, Demanding the Best: How To Restructure the Section 8
Household-Based Rental Assistance Program, 14 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 287, 307
(1996) (documenting the "eagerness of Section 8 recipients to move and the wide
availability of moderately priced rental housing" but the failure of certificate
holders to "leave poor, minority neighborhoods").
88. This is not the first scholarly piece to propose a national voucher program aimed
at eliminating racial ghettoization. Alexander Polikoff has proposed that HUD
dedicate a portion of the Section 8 vouchers made available each year for use by
African-Americans living in ghettos to move to suburbs. Alex Polikoff, A Vision
for the Future: Bringing Gautreaux to Scale, in KEEPING THE PROMISE: PRESERVING
AND ENHANCING HOUSING MOBILITY IN THE SECTION 8 HOUSING CHOICE
VOUCHER PROGRAM 137, 141 (Philip Tegeler et al. eds., 2005), available at
http://www.prrac.org/pdf/KeepingPromise.pdf; see also ALEXANDER POLIKOFF,
WAITING FOR GAUTREAUX: A STORY OF SEGREGATION, HOUSING, AND THE BLACK
GHETTO (2006) (explaining in depth the Gautreax case and its aftermath). Owen
Fiss has proposed a new $5o billion voucher program to help black families in
ghettos move to the suburbs. Fiss, supra note 76, at 66. This Note uses Polikoff's
and Fiss's proposals as a launching pad, but it goes into greater detail about how
the suggested opportunity-housing vouchers program would operate (Section
II.A) and how it would avoid the pitfalls of deconcentration policies that have
failed (Section II.B). This Note also differs from previous proposals in articulating
a new theory of justice for housing law-antighettoization theory (Section I.C)-
and in proposing a national voucher program that is grounded specifically in that
theory.
89. The concept of a "community of opportunity" was developed by john a. powell, a
law professor and housing scholar who testified for the plaintiffs in Thompson v.
HUD, 348 F. Supp. 2d 398 (D. Md. 2005). In his scholarly work, powell has created
"opportunity maps" for regions throughout the country. These maps demarcate
various census tracts as "communities of opportunity" according to measures of
economic opportunity, neighborhood health, and educational opportunity. See
powell, supra note 13, at 154.
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communities of opportunity with the No Child Left Behind (NCLB)
mandates, 9° such that 50% or more of any neighborhood's schools would have
to meet NCLB targets in order to qualify as a "community of opportunity." 9'
Once an opportunity-vouchers program is in place, a tenant applying for a
regular Section 8 voucher would have the option of putting her name on a
waiting list for either the standard Section 8 voucher or for the new
opportunity-housing voucher. If she opted for the latter, she would face more
limitations in residential options, but her voucher would carry a higher fair-
market-rent allowance so that she could afford housing in a community of
opportunity.92 To prevent a lack of consumer information from hampering the
program's success, PHAs would be required to inform all Section 8 applicants
about the availability of opportunity-housing vouchers and to explain the
benefits of moving to a high-opportunity neighborhood.
Second, the opportunity-housing vouchers program would differ from
Section 8 in that it would use race as a consideration in determining the
allocation of rental subsidies. Specifically, Congress (at least in the beginning
years) would make vouchers available only to persons living in "racially
concentrated ghetto neighborhoods," setting the parameters for what
constitutes "racially concentrated ghettos" after a process of public hearings and
90. See No Child Left Behind Act of 2ool, Pub. L. No. 107-110, § 1111(b)(2), 115 Stat.
1445.
91. The Dallas organization implementing the deconcentration remedy issued in
Walker v. City of Mesquite, 169 F.3d 973 (5th Cir. 1999), is directing landlord
recruitment efforts to neighborhoods with schools that receive high NCLB
rankings. Philip Tegeler, Connecting Families to Opportunity: The Next Generation
of Housing Mobility Policy, in ALL THINGS BEING EQUAL: INSTIGATING
OPPORTUNITY IN AN INEQUITABLE TIME 79, 91-92 (Brian D. Smedley & Alan
Jenkins eds., 2007).
92. Under current law, local PHAs have discretion to set payment rates for Section 8
vouchers at up to 11o% of the "fair-market-rent" (FMR) levels in the area. CTR. ON
BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, INTRODUCTION TO THE HOUSING VOUCHER
PROGRAM 4 (2009), http://www.cbpp.org/files/5-15-o9hous.pdf [hereinafter CBPP
REPORT]. The FMR is HUD's estimate of the cost of rent and utilities for 40% of
the recently rented units in the metropolitan area. Id. Currently, FMRs are too
low to enable Section 8 recipients to rent in suburban neighborhoods. First, FMRs
are based on regional averages, and, when "much of a region's rental housing
stock is located in poorer city neighborhoods where lower rental rates prevail,
regional FMRs may not be high enough to allow access to many suburban
apartments." Tegeler et al., supra note 83, at 478. Second, due to funding
constraints, PHAs often are unable to offer payment rates above lOO% of the FMR.
Barbara Sard, Summary Table: Housing Voucher Program Policies that Influence
Housing Voucher Mobility, in KEEPING THE PROMISE, supra note 88, at 73, 73.
Under the proposed opportunity-housing vouchers program, HUD would
provide PHAs with sufficient resources to set payment standards at higher
levels-up to 120% or even 150% of current FMRs within a region, for example-
so that the vouchers could enable renting in communities of opportunity.
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consultations with urban policy specialists. 93 In an ideal world, Congress would
provide enough funding for the program such that every person living in a
highly poor urban neighborhood-regardless of its racial composition-could
obtain an opportunity-housing voucher. In a more realistic world where federal
funding is limited, Congress cannot or will not provide enough money to make
the vouchers universally available, at least in the first years of the program.
Accordingly, HUD would instruct public housing authorities to make vouchers
available only to those applicants currently residing in neighborhoods defined
by a threshold level of poverty and a threshold concentration of racial
minorities.
Both the area-limitations feature (for selecting the target sites where
vouchers can be used) and the race-consciousness feature (for identifying the
neighborhoods where residents will be prioritized when vouchers are
disbursed) are essential for an opportunity-housing vouchers program to
conform to its normative objectives. First, because the program's goal is to
dismantle the racialized ghetto, not to expand the residential choices of low-
income families, it is essential that there be restrictions on where the vouchers
are used. The target neighborhoods do not need to be predominantly white,
black, or comprised primarily of any other racial demographic. The goal of the
program is not integration. But they do need to be true communities of
opportunity. Second, because the program's goal is to interrupt the
perpetuation of racial caste through the housing market, not to help all low-
income families find housing, it is also essential that vouchers be targeted to
those living in racially concentrated ghetto areas until they are universally
available.
An opportunity-housing vouchers program is by no means the only
conceivable public policy for implementing an antighettoization theory. Rather,
one alternative mechanism for dismantling the racialized ghetto would be for
the government to provide development grants to entrepreneurs to invest in
downtown areas. Many fair housing advocates champion redevelopment
initiatives as a preferable means of dismantling racialized ghettos, 94 and such
programs have been piloted at the state and federal levels several times in recent
decades.
93. For instance, "racially concentrated ghettos" might be defined as urban census
areas with poverty rates of 30% or more and a 60% minority threshold. See
ROBINSON & GRANT-THOMAS, supra note 39, at 23 (describing racial ghettos as
generally having these features).
94. For work promoting the use of development grants and enterprise zones to
improve the lives of low-income African-Americans in ghettos, see J. Phillip
Thompson, Beyond Moralizing, in A WAY OUT, supra note 76; and Tein, supra
note 75. For a proposal that is related to the enterprise zone idea but that centers
on having the government implement a major public-works program in ghetto
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From a policy standpoint, a voucher program is a preferable means of
realizing an antighettoization theory of justice relative to a revitalization
strategy because it is quicker, less costly, and more likely to succeed. Scholars
such as Rebecca Blank, Paul Jargowsky, and David Neumark have found that
urban "enterprise zone" (EZ) programs undertaken by states during the 198os
and by the federal government during the 199os created relatively few new jobs,
incurred large financial costs, and failed to reach many of the poorest
neighborhoods in metropolitan areas. For instance, Blank found that among
thirty-seven states that implemented EZs in the 198os, most failed to attract new
businesses to low-income areas. 95 David Neumark and Jed Kolko, after
analyzing federally sponsored EZs in California between the 199os and 2008,
concluded that "enterprise zones do not increase employment," that they do
not shift employment toward lower-wage workers, and that the program is
ineffective in achieving its primary goals. 96
Even scholars who are more optimistic about the feasibility of
redevelopment strategies concede the high costs of such approaches. For
instance, Matias Busso and Patrick Kline of Yale's Department of Economics
applaud the Clinton Administration's EZ and enterprise community (EC)
policies, finding that those programs "substantially affected local labor and
housing market conditions" for urban areas. 9 Nonetheless, Busso and Kline's
analysis also shows that from 1994 to 2000, between si billion and $3 billion was
spent on EZs nationally in order to lift 50,000 individuals out of poverty. 9' This
means that about $40,000 was spent rescuing each person from impoverished
conditions. In comparison, rental subsidies under the Section 8 program in
2004 averaged approximately $6500 per individual. 99 Assuming that subsidies in
the opportunity-housing vouchers program would have to increase by 20% over
current levels to enable families to move to communities of opportunity,' and
95. REBECCA M. BLANK, IT TAKES A NATION: A NEW AGENDA FOR FIGHTING
POVERTY 187-88 (1997).
96. David Neumark & Jed Kolko, Do Enterprise Zones Create Jobs? Evidence from
California's Enterprise Zone Program 30-33 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 14530, rev. ed. 2010).
97. Matias Busso & Patrick Kline, Do Local Economic Development Programs Work?
Evidence from the Federal Empowerment Zone Program 27 (Yale Econ. Dep't
Working Paper, No. 36, 20o8), available at http://www.econ.yale.edu/ddp/ddp25/
ddpoo36.pdf.
98. Id. at 9, 27.
99. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, RENTAL HOUSING ASSISTANCE: POLICY
DECISIONS AND MARKET FACTORS EXPLAIN CHANGES IN THE COSTS OF THE
SECTION 8 PROGRAMS 32 (2006), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/
do6405.pdf [hereinafter GAO REPORT].
1oo. Cf H.R. 1851, 1oth Cong. § 12(a) (2007) (allowing PHAs to provide subsidies
under Section 8 at up to 120% of the FMR). This bill, known as SEVRA, was
proposed in order to enhance Section 8's portability feature. Using SEVRA as a
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assuming that national rents stay as high as they were in 2004 (which is
unlikely),' 1 a cost of $7800 per person would still remain under the
opportunity-housing vouchers program, one-fifth of the per-person cost of the
EZ strategy. 2
B. Avoiding the Pitfalls of Prior Deconcentration Programs and Learning
from Thompson v. HUD
The opportunity-housing vouchers program may be grounded in a strong
theory of justice, and it may be the most efficacious means of realizing justice as
compared to alternatives. Still, what are the chances that it will succeed in
practice? Efforts to deconcentrate' 3 the ghetto have been tried and tested
through federal court orders, executive agency programs, and congressional
demonstration projects for forty years. These undertakings have varied in
realized success. The Moving to Opportunity (MTO) experiment of the 199os
stands as the starkest example of a generally fruitless initiative. MTO's
shortcomings are particularly instructive here because MTO, like opportunity-
housing vouchers, was a national program that attempted to deconcentrate
through the disbursement of vouchers at the administrative level.
In order for opportunity-housing vouchers to succeed, practitioners must
overcome the problems that have tempered the success of deconcentration
programs in the past. This undertaking is a serious, but by no means an
impossible, one. First, the housing discrimination case of Thompson v. HUD,
1°4
currently pending in its remedy phase in Maryland federal district court, offers
useful instruction for practitioners in overcoming supply-and-demand barriers
to housing mobility and in ensuring that the shortcomings of MTO are not
replicated. Moreover, beyond Thompson, there are various ways of fashioning a
benchmark, this Note estimates that Section 8 subsidies would need to increase by
a minimum of 20% over current levels in the opportunity-housing vouchers
program to enable families to move to communities of opportunity.
1oi. Subsidies in Section 8 are unlikely to be as high as they were in 2004 going
forward because rents in 2004 were artificially elevated due to the housing bubble.
GAO REPORT, supra note 99, at 25, 31. National home prices and rents have
already corrected considerably since 2004.
102. Granted, the $7800 figure refers only to the annual cost per person under the
opportunity-housing vouchers program. Once families move to the suburbs,
however, they are likely to find employment and to become more self-sufficient.
Even assuming a three-year cost of $23,400 per person under the opportunity-
housing vouchers program, it would still be only half the cost of lifting someone
out of poverty in the enterprise zone programs studied by Busso and Kline.
103. This Section uses the terms "deconcentration" and "housing mobility"
interchangeably. Both terms are meant to refer to government policies that-
similar to this Note's proposed opportunity-housing vouchers program-seek to
move minority families from the ghetto into high-opportunity neighborhoods.
104. 348 F. Supp. 2d 398 (D. Md. 2005).
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deconcentration program so that the subsequent achievement of families who
move becomes part of the program itself. This Note proposes original features
for the opportunity-housing vouchers program that demand "responsibility-
sharing" from the beneficiaries. By incorporating expectations of
socioeconomic improvement into the voucher program itself, this Note's
proposal goes beyond anything MTO ever attempted in using vouchers to end
racial subordination.
i. The Promises and Perils of Deconcentration
Deconcentration programs have produced a mixed record. On the one
hand, there is robust evidence that a well-designed deconcentration project can
work, i.e., that it can both dismantle the ghetto and interrupt the perpetuation
of racial caste. The most rigorous studies of any court-ordered deconcentration
program to date are those by James Rosenbaum and his colleagues at
Northwestern University analyzing the remedial order in the Gautreaux
housing suit. The Gautreaux order, which grew out of a consent decree from
1976 between HUD and an African-American plaintiff class from Chicago's
poorest neighborhoods, 1°5 instructed HUD to create new housing vouchers that
would move 7100 families out of the ghetto and into the suburbs.1°6 Through
several econometric studies, Rosenbaum has demonstrated that the Gautreaux
program yielded statistically significant socioeconomic gains for the families
that participated.
°7
Gautreaux's success in facilitating residential mobility and socioeconomic
gains for moving families was replicated to some degree in other court-ordered
deconcentration programs. According to anecdotal reports, the judicial decrees
in at least three other housing lawsuits (brought in Memphis, Milwaukee, and
Cincinnati) resulted in significant numbers of families moving to the suburbs
and remaining there over time °s In New York, a group of scholars replicating
105. See Gautreaux v. Pierce, 690 F.2d 616, 621 (7 th Cir. 1982) (discussing the consent
decree reached in 1976).
1O6. Gautreaux v. Landrieu, 523 F. Supp. 665, 674-80 (N.D. Ill. 1981); see also Cara
Hendrickson, Racial Desegregation and Income Deconcentration in Public Housing,
9 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 35, 58-59 (2002) (describing the consent decree
in detail).
107. See, e.g., LEONARD S. RUBINOWITZ & JAMES E. ROSENBAUM, CROSSING THE CLASS
AND COLOR LINES: FROM PUBLIC HOUSING TO WHITE SUBURBIA 163 & tbl.9 .i
(2000); James E. Rosenbaum, Changing the Geography of Opportunity by
Expanding Residential Choice: Lessons from the Gautreaux Program, 6 HOUSING
POL'Y DEBATE 231 (1995).
1o8. Hendrickson, supra note 1o6, at 59-60 (noting the success of programs in
Memphis, Milwaukee, and Cincinnati); see also Florence Wagman Roisman &
Hilary Botein, Housing Mobility and Life Opportunities, 27 CLEARINGHOUSE REV.
335 (1993) (surveying the outcomes of about a dozen court-ordered
deconcentration programs).
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the type of study that Rosenbaum used for Gautreaux found that a housing
decree in Yonkers produced cognizable employment gains for families that
moved and lower welfare rates.° 9
Nonetheless, the majority of deconcentration programs implemented either
through courts or through administrative channels since Gautreaux has shown
quite modest, if not outright disappointing, outcomes. In terms of both
dismantling the ghetto and facilitating racial equality more broadly, most
programs appear to have fallen short. MTO is the most vivid example. Scholars
have found three types of obstacles that tend to undermine mobility programs:
demand-side, supply-side, and success-oriented difficulties.
First, on the demand side, African-American families are often reluctant to
make voluntary, long-term moves to white neighborhoods. In the Section 8
context today, close to 30% of the minority families who obtain vouchers end
up moving to high-poverty neighborhoods."1 In HOPE VI, a federal program
put in place under President Clinton that gives localities block grants for the
demolition, rehabilitation, and relocation of public housing projects," scholars
similarly have found that African-American families tend to move from
"'vertical ghettos [to] horizontal ghettos.""'
2
Results from MTO also suggest that minority families in racially
concentrated neighborhoods hold preferences to remain in those
neighborhoods, or in neighborhoods that are similar. MTO was a four-year
mobility project authorized by Congress in 1992 that sought to facilitate the
deconcentration of ghettos in several U.S. cities. Under the program, minority
families in the "experimental" group received housing vouchers that had to be
used in census tract areas that were less than lO% poor. In 2003, a
comprehensive study of MTO found that, despite the program's restrictions on
where vouchers could be used, the vast majority of MTO participants in the
experimental group had chosen to rent in the same central city jurisdiction in
which they lived before the program, and in neighborhoods as racially
lo9. Rebecca C. Fauth, The Impacts of Neighborhood Poverty Deconcentration Efforts on
Low-Income Children's and Adolescents' Well-Being, 14 CHILD., YOUTH & ENV'TS 1,
12 (2004) ("Compared to stayers, mover adults were more likely to be employed
and less likely to receive welfare.").
11o. DEBORAH J. DEVINE ET AL., U.S. DEP'T. OF Hous. & URBAN DEV., HOUSING
CHOICE VOUCHER LOCATION PATTERNS: IMPLICATIONS FOR PARTICIPANT AND
NEIGHBORHOOD WELFARE 28 (2003), available at http://www.huduser.org/
publications/pdf/Location-Paper.pdf (surveying the Section 8 program's impact
across fifty metropolitan areas).
Il. 42 U.S.C. § 1437 (2oo6).
112. Hendrickson, supra note lO6, at 65 (quoting Brian Maney & Sheila Crowley,
Scarcity and Success: Perspectives on Assisted Housing, 9 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING &
COMMUNITY DEV. L. 319, 339 (2000)).
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concentrated as their original ones."3 Many of the families who did relocate to
more suburban-type neighborhoods moved back within a year or two." 4 These
findings certainly are not dispositive on the issue of preferences. First, they do
not show that preferences arefixed, were a well-designed counseling program to
be established, and second, the MTO results were driven by both the
participants' preferences and the availability of rentals. 5 Nonetheless, the
combination of results from Section 8, HOPE VI, and MTO do suggest that
demand-side preferences, at least to some degree, play a role in tempering the
success of deconcentration.
A second factor that undermines the success of mobility efforts is an
inadequate supply of housing in nonghetto neighborhoods that is both
affordable and open to government-subsidized tenants. This supply-side
constraint has been apparent in both congressionally authorized mobility
projects and in court-ordered ones. In the Section 8 program, about 11% of
families obtaining a voucher are unable to use it within the allotted period of
time before it expires."6 Section 8 participants and HOPE VI users struggle to
find apartments they can afford or landlords who will accept them in any
neighborhood, and the constraints are even greater in high-opportunity
neighborhoods. Similarly, many mobility programs ordered by courts have also
failed because of supply-side barriers. In both the NAACP v. Township of Mount
LaureP7 and United States v. Yonkers Board of Education cases,"' for example,
relatively few families were able to benefit from the mobility remedies that were
ordered by the court because there was an inadequate supply of affordable
housing (often because resistant suburban communities blocked new housing
from being constructed) outside the central city."9
113. LARRY ORR ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN DEV., MOVING TO
OPPORTUNITY: INTERIM IMPACTS EVALUATION, at viii (2003), available at
http://www.huduser.org/Publications/pdf/MTOFullReport.pdf.
114. Id. at 33 (finding that 66% of the families that moved made one or more additional
moves and that a substantial number returned to neighborhoods similar to those
in which they started).
115. Id. at 31 (finding that one "likely" explanation for why MTO participants tended
to make horizontal moves to racially concentrated neighborhoods, many of which
were in economic decline, was that "families found it easier to rent units" in such
places).
116. Cf. CBPP REPORT, supra note 92, at 8 n.5.
117. 456 A.2d 390 (N.J. 1983) [hereinafter Mount Laurel I].
118. 624 F. Supp. 1276 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). Yonkers was brought as a school desegregation
case but culminated in the issuance of a judicial decree related to housing
desegregation.
119. Peter H. Schuck, Judging Remedies: Judicial Approaches to Housing Segregation, 37
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 289, 314-15 (2002) ("Almost twenty years after Mount
Laurel II, few analysts of the affordable housing problem find much to show for
all the time and trouble .... The state has not come close to meeting the [low-
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Finally, the third factor that has undermined the success of mobility
programs in the past has been the failure of families to realize socioeconomic
gains once they move from the ghetto to higher-quality neighborhoods. In the
Yonkers case, although scholars found evidence of economic gains for adults,
they also found that young people who moved to the suburbs showed more
behavioral problems and higher school delinquency rates than their
counterparts who did not. 20 In MTO, the failure of deconcentration to produce
socioeconomic gains has been striking. 2' With respect to children in the MTO
project, experts unanimously agree that there is "no evidence that MTO moves
have led to better educational outcomes."'2 Teenage boys who moved have
engaged in higher amounts of risky behavior and have been less likely to
succeed academically." 3 For adults in MTO, analysts agree again that there has
been "little difference between experimental and control groups in




The "success-oriented" obstacles for deconcentration programs underscore
the importance of carefully selecting target neighborhoods when implementing
mobility programs. Policymakers must ensure that families are directed to areas
that are true communities of opportunity. MTO defined the target
neighborhoods only in terms of their poverty rates, rather than in terms of a
income housing supply] targets [in suburban areas that had practice exclusionary
zoning].... Mount Laurel [has] moved few poor people from cities to suburbs.");
id. at 326 (arguing that in Yonkers, "[a]fter a generation of litigation and fifteen
years of resolute supervision by a resourceful judge . . . the remedies remain
mostly empty words" and documenting the defendants' inability to provide new
housing supply in higher-income areas).
120. Fauth, supra note 109, at 12 ("[Tihe short-term results garnered from the Yonkers
Project are mixed. Overall, adults in the sample responded well to moves as
evidenced by their improved economic and health-related outcomes. Youth,
however, reported more behavior problems following moves compared with their
peers who did not relocate.").
121. One important exception has been with respect to mental and physical health
outcomes of certain populations. See Jeffrey R. Kling, Jeffrey B. Liebman &
Lawrence F. Katz, Experimental Analysis of Neighborhood Effects, 75
ECONOMETRICA 83, 102 (2007) (finding that moving had "beneficial impacts on
mental health" for adults).
122. Margery Austin Turner & Dolores Acevedo-Garcia, The Benefits of Housing
Mobility: A Review of Research Evidence, in KEEPING THE PROMISE, supra note 88,
at 9, 17.
123. Note, however, that the opposite results were shown for teenage girls who moved
within the MTO program. See Susan Clampet-Lundquist et al., Moving At-Risk
Teenagers out of High-Risk Neighborhoods: Why Girls Fare Better than Boys 17-18,
23 (Princeton Univ. Indus. Relations, Working Paper No. 509, 2006).
124. Stephanie DeLuca, The Continuing Relevance of the Gautreaux Program for
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broad array of opportunity indicators. Thus, many MTO adults wound up in
neighborhoods with a low job supply, and many MTO students wound up in
schools within their original school districts.'25 As the interim review of the
MTO program conceded: "One of the lessons of the MTO demonstration is
that the poverty rate, while important, may be an overly simplistic way to
characterize neighborhoods. Residential environments are multidimensional,
and no one measure will capture all the attributes that are important to the life
chances of low-income families. ' 6 But beyond a careful selection of target
neighborhoods, the evidence also suggests that deconcentration programs
should be designed to facilitate explicitly the socioeconomic achievement of
participating households. Exiting the ghetto certainly opens doors, but it is not
a panacea for success.
2. Improving Demand and Supply
The three obstacles that have undermined mobility efforts in the past-
supply-side, demand-side, and success-oriented roadblocks-are not
insurmountable. This Subsection explores how the pending Thompson v. HUD
case offers instructive approaches for overcoming both the demand and supply
obstacles to residential mobility. The following Subsection extends beyond
Thompson to suggest original ideas for designing programs that maximize the
socioeconomic gains of moving families. Together, these observations
demonstrate that opportunity-housing vouchers can succeed where MTO and
other programs did not.
By way of background, Thompson v. HUD is one of the largest housing
discrimination lawsuits brought to date. The case began in 1995, when a class of
African-American public housing residents in Baltimore sued HUD and the
Housing Authority of Baltimore City (HABC) in federal court. The plaintiffs
alleged that, for decades, the defendants had discriminated against minorities
when carrying out public housing policies. The result, the plaintiffs claimed,
was a public housing stock for African-Americans concentrated almost
exclusively in the poor African-American ghettos of East and West Baltimore
City, also termed Baltimore's "impacted areas."2 7 In 1996, the parties reached a
partial consent decree resolving some of the issues in the case. Specifically, for
3000 high-rise units in "impacted-areas," the HABC agreed to undertake
demolition and replacement, putting in place iooo new "hard" units on the
same sites and 2000 new units in "nonimpacted areas." ''  The latter portion
125. Tegeler, supra note 91, at 91.
126. ORR ET AL., supra note 113, at 162.
127. Thompson v. HUD, 220 F.3d 241, 244 (4th Cir. 2000) ("Broadly speaking,
impacted areas are areas with high concentrations of public or low-income
housing or with high minority populations.")
128. Telephone Interview with Andrew D. Freeman, Lead Counsel for Plaintiffs in
Thompson v. HUD, Brown Goldstein & Levy (Feb. 10, 2010). While the 1996 decree
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constituted the "desegregative" part of the settlement.2 9 The HABC made
virtually no progress, however, on the 2000 desegregative units for the next 8
years. The plaintiffs brought a noncompliance motion in 2002130 and reinitiated
the unsettled portion of the original case in 2003.1
In January 2005, Judge Garbis issued his decision in Thompson v. HUD.
Reviewing the gamut of Baltimore City and HUD's housing practices in
Baltimore back to the 1950s, Judge Garbis declined to find the local defendants
liable but issued an excoriating opinion with respect to HUD's liability under
the Fair Housing Act (FHA).' 32 In March 2006, Judge Garbis held remedial
hearings, during which the plaintiffs presented and defended their Proposed
Remedial Order.'3 3 No formal remedy has yet been issued, but the Obama
Administration agreed in early 2010 to enter into settlement negotiations.
34
covered 3000 public housing units in Baltimore, there had been another 6000 to
8ooo housing units encompassed within the plaintiffs complaint about which no
agreement was reached. Id. It appears that part of the reason Baltimore was
willing to settle on the 3000 units was to take advantage of newly available federal
Hope VI funds. See Thompson, 220 F.3d at 244-45.
129. Telephone Interview with Andrew D. Freeman, supra note 128 (explaining that
1200 of the 200 desegregative units were to be in the form of vouchers).
130. Id. The plaintiffs noncompliance motion was never formally ruled upon, but the
Fourth Circuit later described Baltimore's actions between 1996 and 2002 as being
"jaw-droppingly short of fulfilling their obligations" under the 1996 decree.
Thompson v. HUD, 404 F.3d 821, 824 (4th Cir. 2005). In 2003, the HABC finally
began to comply with its desegregative mandate. It made available new vouchers
for relocation to nonimpacted Baltimore areas and hired two nonprofit
organizations to administer the vouchers and provide counseling. Current and
former families on waiting lists for public housing were eligible to apply. A recent
report finds extraordinary progress under the program thus far. LORA ENGDAHL,
POVERTY & RACE RESEARCH ACTION COUNCIL, NEW HOMES, NEW
NEIGHBORHOODS, NEW SCHOOLS: A PROGRESS REPORT ON THE BALTIMORE
HOUSING MOBILITY PROGRAM 3 (2OO9), available at http://www.prrac.org/pdf/
BaltimoreMobilityReport.pdf [hereinafter PRRAC PROGRESS REPORT] (showing
that about 1500 families have moved from neighborhoods 80% black and 33% poor
to neighborhoods 20% black and 7.5% poor and that the schools in the new
neighborhoods are of significantly higher quality).
131. Thompson v. HUD, 348 F. Supp. 2d 398 (D. Md. 2005).
132. Id. at 409.
133. Plaintiffs' Proposed Remedial Order at 12, Thompson v. HUD, No. MJG-95-309
(D. Md. May 31, 2006).
134. Telephone Interview with Andrew D. Freeman, supra note 128 (explaining that as
of February 2010, the parties have begun settlement discussions); see also Order
Re: Supplemental Hearing at 1, Thompson v. HUD, No. MJG-95-3o9 (D. Md. Jan.
15, 2010) (ordering a supplemental hearing "prior to the completion of the Court's
decision regarding the remedy phase of the instant case" given that "[iut appears
that there may be a pertinent change in regard to certain positions taken herein by
Defendant [HUD]"). See generally Emily Bazelon & Judith Resnik, There's a New
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The plaintiffs Proposed Remedial Order-which hopefully will be put in
place under the pending settlement-is the template for national opportunity
vouchers program outlined in this Note. The core of the remedy requested is
that HUD create 9000 "desegregative housing opportunities" throughout the
Baltimore region, at a rate of 900 per year. " 5 The sheer scale of this request is
ambitious; to date, the two largest deconcentration orders have called for 7000
and 5000 new housing opportunities, in Gautreaux v. Landrieu"36 and Young v.
Cisneros,'37 respectively. All of the new housing opportunities must be located in
what the plaintiffs have identified as "communities of opportunity."
Communities of opportunity are neighborhoods in the Baltimore metropolitan
area that have reasonable levels of job availability, effective educational
institutions, and other indicators of opportunity.3
s
The proposed Thompson remedy is commendable. It contains several
essential features for overcoming both the demand and supply issues that have
troubled mobility projects in the past.
On the demand side, the plaintiffs stipulated that there be premove
counseling, postmove counseling, a regional administration of vouchers, and,
perhaps most importantly, that the mobility vouchers be usable only in
"communities of opportunity."' 13 9 Although none of these program features is
novel per se, they are among the most effective strategies of encouraging
families to move to-and to remain in-the suburbs.
Premove counseling plays a critical role in shaping preferences. 40 In
Buffalo, for instance, the mobility project that grew out of the Comer v. Cisneros
lawsuit'4' required that, before receiving a voucher, a family attend a counseling
Lawyer in Town: The Top io Cases the Obama Justice Department Should Redo,
SLATE, Feb. 9, 2009, http://www.slate.com/id/22lo637.
135. Plaintiffs' Proposed Remedial Order at 12, Thompson v. HUD, No. MJG-95-3o9
(D. Md. May 31, 2006).
136. 523 F. Supp. 655 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
137. Final Judgment and Decree at 7, Young v. Cisneros, No. P-8o-8-CA (E.D. Tex.
Mar. 30, 1995), available at http://danielbesharalawfirm.com/Documents/
final%2ojudgement%2o1995.pdf.
138. Plaintiffs' Proposed Remedial Order at 17, Thompson v. HUD, No. MJG-95-3o9
(D. Md. May 31, 2006).
139. Id. at 19-20.
140. Hendrickson, supra note io6, at 66 (noting that "more aggressive Gautreaux-like
counseling" as opposed to "moderate counseling" may be what is necessary to
"have an impact on racial segregation").
141. 37 F.3d 775 (2d Cir. 1994). The Comer suit settled in 1996, producing the mobility
program now administered by the nonprofit organization HOME. See Daniel
Trudeau, The Persistence of Segregation in Buffalo, New York: Comer vs. Cisneros
and Geographies of Relocation Decisions Among Low-Income Black Households, 27
URB. GEOGRAPHY 20, 26-29 (2006).
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orientation, a small group workshop, and several individual sessions. The
Comer program has enabled 2000 families to move, and 7 out of io have chosen
to relocate to high-opportunity (often suburban) neighborhoods. 42 In
Baltimore, as part of the pilot mobility program put in place pursuant to the
1996 partial consent decree, premove counseling has gone beyond any
deconcentration project to date. The program provides bus tours of the
suburbs, "visioning" workshops, credit counseling, and even assistance with
paying for security deposits. 43 These services have encouraged approximately
1500 families to move within Baltimore, with 88% relocating from central cities
to suburban areas. 44
Postmove counseling is similarly essential to deconcentration's success.
This type of counseling emboldens families to remain in the suburbs after
moving. 45 In Dallas, the mobility project that grew out of the Walker v. City of
Mesquite lawsuit 46 has provided intensive postmove services, such as school
counseling for children and job-search assistance for adults. The administrator
of the Dallas program champions these services as critical for the 5000 families
who have moved. 47 In Baltimore, the consent decree program offers
participants two years of postmove counseling, during which counselors help
resolve whatever issue might arise-whether it be "transferring Medicaid
benefits, filing taxes or resolving disputes with landlords." 4' Families are also
provided employment services and low-cost financing for purchasing used
cars.'
49
In mandating premove and postmove counseling, the Thompson plaintiffs
adopted a conscientious strategy to follow the models in Buffalo, Dallas, and
Baltimore and avoid the MTO model. Although MTO included a counseling
component, it was optional for participants and not comprehensive. Most cities
implementing MTO only provided counseling at the front end and only in the
form of search assistance so families could "meet the locational constraint
142. ROBINSON & GRANT-THOMAS, supra note 39, at go.
143. PRRAC PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 130, at 16-17.
144. Id. at 3.
145. Tegeler, supra note 91, at 82 ("Recent research on housing mobility programs
suggests that-in addition to reinstating the types of front-end interventions used
by HUD in the 199os to expand the range of neighborhoods accessible to voucher
families-a more sophisticated effort to assist families after they move will be the
key to success in future mobility programs.").
146. 169 F.3d 973 (5 th Cir. 1999).
147. Elizabeth K. Julian, Taking Gautreaux National: The Polikoff Proposal, 1 Nw. J.L. &
Soc. POL'Y 202, 2o8 (2006). The plaintiffs in Thompson studied the postmove
counseling program in Dallas and drew from it directly. Tegeler, supra note 91, at
83.
148. PRRAC PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 130, at 20.
149. Id. at 20-21.
516
28:481 2010
RACIAL JUSTICE AT HOME
within the time for leasing up."'5 ° This lack of in-depth counseling was
unquestionably one reason why so many MTO participants failed to exit the
city.
The other two features of the proposed Thompson remedy aimed at
preempting demand-side issues are a regional administration of vouchers and a
restriction of vouchers to "communities of opportunity." As explained above,
the "communities of opportunity" element will ensure that families relocate to
places where they can become upwardly mobile, rather than relocate to
different but equally unpromising neighborhoods. The regional administration
of the vouchers feature will guarantee that families are provided listings of
rental units throughout the metropolitan area when they obtain their vouchers,
so that their searches are maximally efficient.'
5'
On the supply side, the Thompson plaintiffs have proposed an entirely novel
approach for overcoming the obstacles that mobility programs have faced.
Their main strategy on the supply side is to demand an overhaul of the
relationship between HUD and local housing authorities as part of the judicial
decree. Under the plaintiffs' proposed remedy, HUD would be required to use
every tool in its arsenal to force local housing authorities to provide affordable
housing opportunities in middle-class neighborhoods. Specifically, the remedy
would require that: (i) HUD condition all new community development grants
to Baltimore PHAs on those PHAs' using at least half of the grants to provide
housing in "communities of opportunity";' 2 (2) HUD condition its approval of
all new redevelopment plans in Baltimore on demonstrations by PHAs that the
supply of housing in "communities of opportunity" will be kept constant;'53 and
(3) HUD use "the full extent of any power and discretion it possesses to impose
conditions on grantees, recipients, beneficiaries, [and] participating
150. ORR ET AL., supra note 113, at 2; see also John Goering, Judith D. Feins & Todd M.
Richardson, A Cross-Site Analysis of Initial Moving to Opportunity Demonstration
Results, 13 J. HOUSING RES. 1, 8, 15 (2002) (noting that PHAs in each MTO site
partnered with nonprofit "counseling" agencies and that the "variation in
counseling for the treatment group[s]" provided by such agencies was "one of the
limitations of MTO implementation").
151. Currently, PHAs regularly breach their regulatory duty to inform Section 8
recipients that they can use their vouchers in the suburbs. A regional
administration of vouchers helps solve that problem. Bruce Katz & Margery
Austin Turner, Who Should Run the Voucher Program? A Reform Proposal 7
(Nov. 2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Yale Law & Policy Review).
152. Plaintiffs' Proposed Remedial Order at ii, Thompson v. HUD, No. MJG-95-309
(D. Md. May 31, 2006) ("HUD shall not approve a competitive grant application
for the use of HUD funds for development in the Baltimore Region unless at least
half of the grant funds requested . . . are used to develop public or assisted
housing opportunities in Communities of Opportunity.").
153. Id. ("HUD shall not approve any plans for demolition or redevelopment of public
and assisted housing in the Baltimore Region that would reduce the number of
assisted or affordable units in Communities of Opportunity.").
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jurisdictions" to assist in the creation of "housing opportunities in
Communities of Opportunity."'5 4 In other words, HUD would be required by
court order to withhold all types of grants and benefits from Baltimore housing
authorities-Community Development Block Grants, tax credits, and even
Section 8 vouchers-lest those authorities do everything in their power to
increase the supply of affordable housing in the wealthier parts of the Baltimore
metropolitan area.
The Thompson plaintiffs' strategy is novel because, rather than requesting
that HUD sponsor new construction and then waiting for local authorities to
comply, as was done to some extent in Mount Laurel II, Yonkers, and Walker,
the plaintiffs have requested a radical restructuring of HUD's relationship with
local housing authorities.'5 5 The plaintiffs have sought not to deprive suburban
municipalities of any of their usual local prerogatives; rather, municipalities and
towns still retain the power to enact exclusionary zoning ordinances or to
mount political attacks against the construction of affordable housing. Because
all of HUD's support to Baltimore PHAs would be conditioned on "the creation
of housing opportunities" in wealthier neighborhoods, however, the court
order likely would change the incentives of suburban communities within the
Baltimore area.
In sum, the demand-side and supply-side features that the Thompson
plaintiffs have included in their proposed decree carry significant promise in
helping the deconcentration program reach its objectives. These features could
be transplanted easily into the national opportunity-housing vouchers program
that this Note has proposed. In the opportunity-housing vouchers program,
HUD would require: (1) that all PHAs provide pre- and postmove counseling to
individuals who apply for opportunity-housing vouchers; (2) that opportunity
vouchers only be used in "communities of opportunity"; (3) that certain PHAs
act as "regional administrators" of the opportunity vouchers in each state,
maintaining waitlists and rental listings for the program in large regional areas
(ideally, all of Section 8 would be restructured on a regional level, but such a
goal is beyond the scope of this Note); and (4) that every PHA takes steps
nationally to implement the opportunity-housing vouchers program lest those
authorities lose tax credits, block grants, and general Section 8 funding from
HUD. This final feature likely will require that HUD set benchmarks for the
opportunity-housing vouchers program with all PHAs and then regularly audit
PHAs to see that the benchmarks are met.
154. Id. at 12.
155. The one lawsuit in which a remedy along this model was issued was NAACP v.
Kemp, 721 F. Supp. 361 (D. Mass. 1989), a case in Boston. The power of the Kemp
remedy to overcome supply barriers to deconcentration, however, was limited by
a separate flaw; it had not provided for increased fair-market rents in suburban
areas.
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3. Enhancing Socioeconomic Outcomes
Beyond drawing from the Thompson model, which demonstrates how a
deconcentration program can surmount demand and supply issues,
practitioners also can use new approaches to ensure that mobility programs
overcome "success-oriented" roadblocks. As explained above,156 previous
deconcentration programs have been undermined not only by demand-side
and supply-side obstacles but also by "success-oriented" obstacles-the failure
of families in deconcentration programs to realize socioeconomic gains after
moving. One the one hand, some persons who move from ghettos to
communities of opportunity, no matter how perfectly their mobility program is
designed, will be unable to find new jobs or improve in school. Human failure
is an inevitable part of life; no housing program will completely eliminate it. It
also is the case, however, that the majority of deconcentration programs to date,
with MTO as the prime culprit, have taken a hands-off approach to facilitating
families' socioeconomic achievement after moving. MTO failed even to specify
target neighborhoods where new socioeconomic opportunities for families were
guaranteed.15 7 Moreover, most deconcentration programs including MTO have
left households to decide whether to capitalize on available opportunities after
moving.15s
Besides specifying appropriate target neighborhoods for moving families,
which the opportunity-housing vouchers program would accomplish through
designating "community of opportunity" targets, deconcentration programs
can facilitate socioeconomic gains for movers by requiring "responsibility-
sharing" among beneficiaries. Consider three ideas. First, deconcentration
programs could require that any household receiving a mobility voucher has at
least one adult who is either employed, actively looking for work, or enrolled in
an education program. This follows the model of the federal Earned Income
Tax Credit, in which being employed is also a necessary precondition for
receiving a government benefit.159 The work/looking-for-work rule in the
mobility program might have to be relaxed for extremely poor single-parent
households, but the general notion would be that continued rental assistance
requires one adult in the family to endeavor to move up the income ladder.
156. See supra Section II.B.
157. See supra notes 125-126 and accompanying text.
158. MTO, for instance, did not provide parents postmove counseling for selecting
schools. As a result, children were enrolled in low-performing schools and showed
"stagnant test scores." Lisa Sanbonmatsu et al., Neighborhoods and Academic
Achievement: Results from the Moving to Opportunity Experiment, 41 J. HUM.
RESOURCES 649, 684 (2006) (explaining that many "MTO movers ... continue[d]
to send their children to schools in their old neighborhoods," possibly because
they "were more comfortable with their children's original schools" and that this
was "one of the most important factors behind the stagnant test scores").
159. 26 U.S.C. § 32 (2006).
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Second, deconcentration programs could require that families receiving
mobility vouchers enroll their children in the highest performing schools-
likely magnet and charter schools-in their new neighborhoods. If waiting lists
for those schools were full or if families had compelling reasons to choose
different schools, allowances could be made. But the general rule would be that
rental assistance would also be conditioned on parents' enrolling their children
in the best performing schools available. Third, deconcentration programs
could also incorporate "responsibility-sharing" by requiring that families attend
regular counseling sessions after moving in order to continue receiving rental
support.
These three forms of responsibility-sharing all admittedly would curb the
personal freedoms of the participants in mobility programs. On the other hand,
these obligations are justifiable in a mobility program from a normative
perspective because the entire purpose of housing mobility in the first place is
to prevent the racial ghetto from perpetuating racial subordination. The goal of
housing mobility, and of the national opportunity-housing vouchers program
proposed in this Note, is to realize antighettoization theory and thus interrupt
cycles of racial subordination. Accordingly, requiring that families participating
in housing mobility programs make sacrifices in furtherance of their own
socioeconomic improvement is normatively consistent with the enterprise of
housing mobility itself.
C. Incorporating Opportunity-Housing Vouchers into Current Equal
Protection Jurisprudence
Given that an opportunity-housing vouchers program would be designed
with consciousness of the racial make-up of urban areas, the policy might
appear to run counter to the Supreme Court's contemporary jurisprudence on
equal protection. In Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School
District No. i,16° the Roberts Court set a high bar against the use of race in
government programs. Any time the government "distributes burdens or
benefits on the basis" of race, the plurality opinion held, that action must be
subjected to strict scrutiny. 6 ' To withstand challenge under the Equal
Protection Clause, the "racial classification" must promote a "compelling"
government interest and be narrowly tailored. In Parents Involved, the Court
wrote that, to date, it has sustained racial classifications in only two instances:
for policies that remedy historical, governmental discrimination ' and for
policies that promote diversity in colleges and universities.
63
16o. 551 U.S. 701 (2007) (plurality opinion).
161. Id. at 720.
162. Id. ("[I]n evaluating the use of racial classifications in the school context, [our
prior cases] have recognized two interests that qualify as compelling. The first is
the compelling interest of remedying the effects of past intentional
discrimination."); see also City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469
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Nonetheless, there are two lines of reasoning that the Court could use to
uphold opportunity-housing vouchers under current law. First, the Court could
find that the program survives strict scrutiny. Opportunity-housing vouchers
seek to eliminate racial caste, which the Court has deemed (implicitly) a
"compelling" interest since Brown v. Board of Education.'6 4 The program is not
aimed at "racial balancing," which the Court surely would reject, 6 ' but with
ending minority group subordination so that remedial programs and diversity
measures, which the Court has already sanctioned, ultimately become
unnecessary. On the narrowly tailored prong, opportunity-housing vouchers
only use race as one factor in determining an allocation of benefits to urban
communities, and the Court has deemed this to suffice as "narrow tailoring" for
university admissions.66 Furthermore, "race-neutral alternatives"'6 7  to
dismantling the ghetto would be far less effective. As explained above, 6 ' ghetto
revitalization programs that are "color-blind" would cost significantly more
money-and would take decades longer to achieve-than a voucher-based
program.
The second line of analysis that the Court could employ to uphold
opportunity-housing vouchers under current law is to view the program as
falling into the zone of "race-conscious" policies condoned by Justice
Kennedy's controlling concurrence in Parents Involved. According to Justice
(1989) (upholding minority set-asides for government contracts to remedy
historical discrimination).
163. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 722 ("The second government interest we have
recognized as compelling for purposes of strict scrutiny is the interest in diversity
in higher education...."); see also Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003)
(upholding law school admissions policies that use race as a factor to increase
diversity in the student body).
164. 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954) (holding that segregation in public schools must come to
an end under the mandate of the Equal Protection Clause, because it "generates a
feeling of inferiority [among black children] as to their status in the community
that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone").
165. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 730-31 ("Accepting racial balancing as a compelling
state interest would justify the imposition of racial proportionality throughout
American society[, and] ... racial balancing has no logical stopping point .
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
166. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 339. The Court also has sanctioned government programs that
use race as a factor in the employment context, although not formally as part of
the narrow-tailoring test. See Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987)
(upholding an employment decision in which race was one factor under Title
VII).
167. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 735 ("Narrow tailoring requires 'serious, good faith
consideration of workable race-neutral alternatives'...." (quoting Grutter, 539
U.S. at 339)).
168. See supra Section II.B.
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Kennedy, we should reject an "all-too-unyielding insistence that race []not be a
factor" in government programs.'6 9 Rather, race-conscious activities undertaken
to equalize opportunities and that are careful to avoid "individual typing by
race" should avoid strict scrutiny altogether.' ° Applied here, Justice Kennedy's
concurrence would uphold opportunity-housing vouchers because they share
the two features Justice Kennedy highlighted. First, such vouchers equalize
opportunities across racial groups. Second, they use race only as a background
factor in determining the distribution of benefits, i.e., in identifying those
"racially concentrated ghettos" where residents receive priority in the allocation
of opportunity vouchers when applying for the program. 17' The program thus
avoids "[a]ssigning to each [household] a personal designation according to a
crude system of individual racial classifications.' 7 2 just as Justice Kennedy
condones "strategic site selection" or the "drawing [ofi attendance zones with
general recognition of the demographics of neighborhoods" for public schools,
he should condone opportunity vouchers in the housing context.73 Although
Justice Kennedy's opinion in Parents Involved was a concurrence, there have




The Obama Administration has made a bold commitment to help the
country's poorest urban populations. And, importantly, the Administration
rightly has recast the goal from providing residents of ghettos with better
169. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 787 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also id. at 789
(noting that school assignment "mechanisms [that] are race conscious but do not
lead to different treatment based on a classification that tells each student he or
she is to be defined by race" advance the legitimate interest in equalizing
education opportunity and are "unlikely [to] demand strict scrutiny to be found
permissible").
170. Id. at 788-89.
171. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
172. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 789.
173. Id.
174. Statements by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Breyer during oral argument in
Ricci v. DeStefano implied that Justice Kennedy's concurrence has gained majority
support among the Court's members. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 49,
Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009) (No. 07-1428), available at http://
www.supremecourt.gov/oral-arguments/argument transcripts/07-1428.pdf ("I
have purposefully gone, of course, to the concurring opinion because I believe it's
the controlling opinion in Parents Involved....") (Breyer, J.); id. at 54 ("I
thought both the plurality and the concurrence in Parents Involved accepted the
fact that race conscious action such as school siting or drawing district lines is-is
okay, but discriminating in particular assignments is not.") (Roberts, C.J.).
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housing to providing residents of ghettos with better residential communities.
As the Administration sets out to implement its new vision of urban
transformation, it should bear in mind the normative justifications for and the
policy efficacy of deconcentration. From a normative perspective, justice in the
liberal state demands that the racial ghetto itself disappear. In other words, the
government must deliver upon an antighettoization theory. From a public
policy perspective, the most efficacious means of implementing the
antighettoization principle is to provide minority households with the
capability of moving out of ghettos and into communities of opportunity. And
though many past deconcentration programs have confronted demand-side,
supply-side, and success-oriented roadblocks, there are creative approaches-as
exemplified by the plaintiffs' proposed remedy in Thompson-for overcoming
such obstacles.
This Note has proposed that HUD implement a national opportunity-
housing vouchers program, likely as a component of the extant Section 8
program, to implement the antighettoization principle. The Obama
Administration would not need to seek any new authority for this program
because the Federal Housing Act already instructs the Secretary of Housing and
Urban Development "affirmatively to further" fair housing, '75 and the
opportunity-housing vouchers program would be oriented around exactly that
mission. The two obstacles that the Administration would have to overcome
would be, first, to attain sufficient funding from Congress for opportunity-
housing vouchers, and second, to overcome strict scrutiny review by the
Supreme Court. With respect to funding, the Administration would have to
make the case that although an opportunity-housing vouchers program would
incur a substantial upfront cost, it would be cheaper and quicker than the
alternative strategy of transforming every urban ghetto into a revitalized
neighborhood. With respect to the Supreme Court, the Administration would
have to show that although its program was race-conscious, the government has
a compelling justification for pursuing deconcentration and that the program is
narrowly tailored to its goal."76
The challenges to effectuating antighettoization ideals are considerable. But
the cost of not addressing these challenges is the perpetuation of racial
subordination-through the mechanism of the racial ghetto-for years to
come. The Obama Administration has put urban justice on the presidential
agenda; now it is time to deliver.
175. 42 U.S.C. § 36o8(e)(5) (2006).
176. See supra Section II.C (explaining that the Court's strict scrutiny test would be
triggered by the opportunity-housing vouchers program and analyzing how the
policy would fare under that test).

